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Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code is fading in commercial
and theoretical importance. I
U. C. C. doctrines play an important role in many franchise and
distribution contracts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Some legal academics believe that Article 23 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC or Code), which governs sales of goods, is
increasingly irrelevant to modem problems of commercial law.4 Yet
3 U.C.C. Article 2 (2002). In recent years, Article 2 of the Code has been the subject of a
revision process. In 2003, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated a set of proposed amendments to the Article. To date, only one state
legislature has enacted any of those amendments. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. 12A, § 2-105(1)
(West Supp. 2008) (excluding "information" from the definition of "goods"); id, at § 2-
106(1) (West Supp. 2008) (excluding licenses of "information" from the definition of
"contract of sale"); The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A
Few Facts About The . . . Amendments to U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A, available at
http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucc22A3.asp (last visited
March 10, 2009). As a result, this Paper focuses on the 2002 version of Article 2, which
includes amendments through 2002. The Paper focuses on the 2001 version of Article 1.
4 Gregory Maggs writes that electronic commerce has diminished Article 2's relevance:
[T]he recent growth of electronic commerce actually tends to
diminish the importance of Article 2's present contract formation
rules because it removes many sales transactions from the coverage
of those rules. Moreover, although electronic commerce raises new
legal issues, the states and federal government already have enacted
separate legislation to deal with them.
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attorneys who practice franchise law have recently devoted increased
attention to the article. In 2006, for example, panelists at the American Bar
Association's Annual Forum on Franchising wrote that "even in business
format franchises that [UCC Articles 1 and 2 do] not govern, the
commercial principles set forth in [those articles] are helpful in addressing
issues with individual franchises as well as system-wide problems."5
As the panelists observed, Article 2 does not govern the sale of a
business format franchise,6 such as McDonald's or Burger King. The
article applies only to "transactions in goods,"7 and a franchise is not
"goods" according to the Code definition. 8 The sale lies outside Article 2
even if it gives the franchisee the right to buy goods from the franchisor.
The sale is then a hybrid, in which the franchisee buys not only the right to
buy goods but also rights to the franchisor's intellectual property 9 and to
certain services that the franchisor will perform. Most courts decide
whether Article 2 applies to a hybrid sale by identifying its predominant
purpose. l Those courts are likely to view any sale of goods, or of the right
Gregory E. Maggs, The Waning Importance of Revisions to U. C.C. Article 2, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 595, 598 (2003) (footnote omitted). See also Nimmer, supra note 1, at
235-37.
5 Joseph S. Aboyoun et al., The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C. ') on
Franchising, A.B.A. 29TH ANN. F. ON FRANCHISING W16, at 40 (2006). The authors refer
to the entire Code, but their paper focuses on Articles I and 2. Id. at 1. As the authors
observe, Code articles other than Article 2 may apply to disputes involving business
format franchises. Id. A security interest in the franchisee's equipment, for example, is
subject to Article 9. See, e.g., Daniel L. Waddell & Jim Phipps, How Franchisors Can
Benefitfrom U. C.C. RevisedArticle 9, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 74 (2001).
6 See I W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:14
(2007) ("Business format franchising involves, in addition to the sale of a product or
service under a trademark, a marketing strategy or plan, operating manuals, standards,
quality control measures and heavy supervision by the franchisor." (footnote omitted)).
U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002).
'See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2002).
9 The sale of the franchise will include not a sale of the intellectual property but rather a
license of the right to use the property. See, e.g., William A. Finkelstein & Christopher P.
Bussert, Trademark Law Fundamentals and Related Franchising Issues, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 1, 4 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds.,
2004). The license poses another issue with respect to the applicability of Article 2. See
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-1 (5th ed.
2004); Comment, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Franchise Distribution
Agreements, 1969 DUKE L.J. 959, 974-77 (1969). The author of the comment submits
"that the essence of a franchise agreement is the licensing of a trademark, and for reasons
emanating from this premise, the granting of rights to the franchisee cannot be considered
a sale within the Code since the requisite 'passing of title' to these rights does not occur.
Id. at 977.
10 James White and Robert Summers describe the majority and minority approaches:
In... "hybrid" cases, a minority of courts apply Article 2 only to the
sale of goods aspects of the transaction, whereas a majority apply
Article 2 only if the "predominant purpose" of the whole transaction
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to purchase goods, as a minor aspect of the sale of a business format
franchise.' As a result, to the extent that neither a statute nor a regulation
controls, the common law will govern the sale.
As the panelists also recognized, however, Article 2 principles can
assist in resolving issues that arise outside the article's textual boundaries.
That insight underlies a large body of case law in which courts have applied
Article 2 sections by analogy to transactions other than sales of goods.1
2
In the spirit of the panelists' insight and those cases, this Paper
urges courts to apply UCC section 2-31313-the Article 2 section on
express warranties-by analogy to sales of business format franchises. In
particular, courts should treat affirmations of fact and promises in a
franchise disclosure document as express warranties, enforceable by the
franchisee following a franchise sale. A franchisee who suffers losses
caused by a false or otherwise misleading affirmation or a broken promise
in a disclosure document would then have a common law contract action
for breach of warranty.
Franchise disclosure documents are required by a trade regulation
rule of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Agency). The rule, entitled
"Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising" (Rule
or FTC Rule),1 4 requires a franchisor to furnish a disclosure document to a
prospective franchisee at least fourteen calendar days before making a
binding contract with, or receiving any money from, the prospective
franchisee.15  The Agency promulgated the Rule in the exercise of its
authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).' 6
The Rule requires truthful disclosures, and a violation may trigger
Agency enforcement, 17 but there is no private action, either express or
implied, under the Rule or the FTC Act. 8 The common law warranty
was a sale of goods, and in that event, the majority applies Article 2
to the whole. If a sale of goods is not the "predominant purpose,"
then Article 2 does not apply at all.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 1- I, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
11 Id. at 9; 2 Garner, supra note 6, § 8:3. See also Stewart v. Lucero, 918 P.2d 1, 4-5
(N.M. 1996) (primary purpose of agreement for sale of business as a going concern was
not sale of goods, so agreement was not subject to Article 2); Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. et
al. v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Corp., No. 05-95-01525-CV, 1997 WL 153794, at *5 (Tex.
App. Apr. 3, 1997) (license of right to use soft-drink syrups in making soft drinks and
other non-sale aspects of franchise agreement predominated, so agreement was not subject
to Article 2).
12 See infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
3 U.C.C. § 2-313 (2002).
14 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1 to .11 (2008).
" Id. § 436.2.
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006). For the Agency's authority to promulgate the Rule, see id
§ 57a(a).
'1 Id. § 57b (2006).
18 See infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
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action would help remedy the injustice that the lack of a private action can
create.
Part II of this Paper explains the problem that can result from the
lack of a private action. The Part begins with a hypothetical case which
illustrates the harm that a Rule violation can produce and then reviews tort
and contract actions, other than warranty actions, that might in theory be
available to the injured franchisee. The review reveals an uneven legal
landscape. Depending on the jurisdiction, the injured franchisee may or
may not be able to hold the franchisor liable under the common law of torts
or a state statute. Absent a warranty, moreover, the franchisor may not be
liable for breach of contract.
Part III explains and endorses the express warranty action that the
franchisee can invoke as at least a partial solution to the problem. Although
the common law governs the franchise sale, in every state except
Louisiana19 UCC section 2-313 can play an important role in persuading the
court that the contents of the disclosure document should be enforceable as
express warranties. Even if the court adopts the warranty action, however,
the common law of contract may leave the injured franchisee one step short
of recovery. Evidence of an express warranty that is not incorporated in a
formal contract of sale may be excluded under the parol evidence rule. Part
II therefore concludes with an analysis of a new FTC Rule provision that
the franchisee can invoke to ensure that the court will admit the evidence of
the warranty.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. Misleading Disclosure and Resulting Injury
Consider the hypothetical case of Louisa Brown, 20 who lived in a
major city and wanted to operate her own business. In response to an
advertisement for Paula's Ice Cream Parlor (Paula's) franchises Brown met
with a sales manager for the company. The manager gave her a franchise
disclosure document that contained the following provision:
Paula's employs its own real estate location experts to
assist its franchisees in succeeding in their stores. Paula's
will assume responsibility for selecting, obtaining, and
negotiating a suitable location for the Paula's store. When
a location has been approved, Paula's will negotiate a
19 Louisiana has not adopted Article 2 of the Code. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9,
at 1.
20 Brown's story is based loosely on the facts of Brennan v. Carvel Corp., 929 F.2d 801
(Ist Cir. 1991).
2009]
440 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA W [Vol. 3:2
JOURNAL
rental arrangement, prepare and approve lease documents,
and handle the closing and signing of the lease.2'
The document stated that Paula's made no earnings claim to prospective
franchisees, and that no representative of the company had authority to
make any such claim. It did not state that the affirmations and promises it
contained would survive the closing of a franchise sale.
A Paula's employee named Alan Swift, who had recently been
given responsibility for site selection, worked with Brown in finding a
location for her store.22 Swift lacked experience in locating soft ice cream
franchise stores in downtown areas. He conducted a survey, but the survey
contained inaccuracies concerning the location of streets and landmarks and
relied on some obsolete information. Based on the survey results and his
limited experience, he approved a site in a downtown location.
Most soft ice cream stores in the greater metropolitan area were
located in suburban locations, and seventy per cent of the sales of a typical
Paula's store were take-home sales. A downtown store was not well suited
to take-home sales because customers had to worry about the ice cream
melting on the way home. Moreover, there was insufficient foot traffic to
sustain a soft ice cream store at the site.
Brown believed that Swift was an expert, and she relied on his
approval of the site. She and Paula's signed a document (Franchise
Agreement), thereby making a contract (Franchise Contract) for the sale of
23
a franchise. The Franchise Contract gave her the right to operate a
21 In Brennan, the disclosure document which Carvel gave to prospective franchisees in
Boston contained the following provision:
Carvel will assume responsibility for selecting, obtaining and
negotiating a suitable location for the Carvel Store. When a location
has been approved, Carvel will negotiate a rental arrangement,
prepare and approve lease documents, and handle the closing and
signing of the lease. A one time real estate fee of $2,500.00 is paid
by the [franchisee].
Id. at 804. An informational brochure given to the franchisees with the disclosure
document stated: "Carvel employs its own Real Estate location experts ... dedicated to
help its [franchisees] succeed in their stores." Id. at 803.
22 Selection of sites for franchises can occur either before or after execution of a franchise
agreement. Gaylen L. Knack & Troy A. Bader, Franchisor Liability in the Market-
Development and Site-Selection Process: Location, Location . . . Liability?, 13
FRANCHISE L.J. 39, 42 (1993) ("In certain instances, the site may be selected in advance of
the execution of a franchise or site-selection agreement. Franchisors may also locate a
site for a prospective franchised business pursuant to the terms of a franchise or a site-
selection agreement.").
23 Arthur Corbin lists three different meanings of the term "contract":
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Paula's store at the site. The Franchise Agreement made no reference to
site selection or site selection assistance, and it contained a merger, or
integration, clause.
Brown worked diligently in her store but soon discovered that the
site was not suitable for a soft ice cream franchise. She did her best to
obtain accounts for "office and institutional" sales, and managed to obtain
about thirty such accounts, but in the end she was forced to close the store.
Her losses included both her sunk costs and the profits she had expected to
make.
B. Possible Tort and Non- Warranty Contract Actions
Brown may sue in tort and/or for breach of contract without
invoking warranty law. This subpart assesses her prospects for success,
first in tort and then in contract.
1. Tort
Brown may consider one or more of five tort actions: violation of
the FTC Rule, negligence per se, violation of a state franchise disclosure
act, violation of a state unfair trade practices act, and common law
misrepresentation.2 4 The first action will almost certainly fail. Depending
A study of its common usage will show that the term "contract" has
been made to denote three different kinds of things in various
combinations: (1) the series of operative acts of the parties
expressing their assent, or some part of these acts; (2) a physical
document executed by the parties as an operative fact in itself and as
lasting evidence of their having performed other necessary acts
expressing their intention; (3) the legal relations resulting from the
operative acts of the parties, always including the relation of right in
one party and duty in the other.
1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3 (1963). In this Paper, "Franchise
Agreement" refers to the document that Brown and Paula's executed to conclude the sale
of her franchise and "Franchise Contract" refers to the legal relations resulting from their
operative acts. The term "franchise agreement" refers to a document executed to conclude
the sale of a franchise by a franchisor other than Paula's to a franchisee other than Brown.
The term "franchise contract" refers to the legal relations resulting from the execution of a
franchise agreement by parties other than Brown and Paula's.
24 See generally John D. Holland et al., Litigating Disclosure Claims, A.B.A. 31st ANN. F.
ON FRANCHISING W 20 (2008). A sixth tort possibility in Brown's case may lie in the law
of negligence. In J & R Ice Cream Corp. v. California Smoothie Licensing Corp., 31 F.3d
1259 (3r Cir. 1994), a prospective franchisee named J & R Ice Cream entered into a site
selection agreement with a franchisor called California Smoothie Licensing. The
agreement made site selection and lease negotiation J & R's responsibility, but California
Smoothie actually selected a site and negotiated a lease for J & R's store. J & R paid a
franchise fee and executed a franchise agreement, but experienced disappointing sales and
paid a higher percentage of gross sales in maintenance fees than its principals had
expected to pay. Id. at 1262-64. J & R sued, and a jury rendered a verdict in its favor on
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on the governing jurisdiction (Brown's jurisdiction or her jurisdiction), one
or more of the other four may succeed. This section begins by assessing the
viability of each of the five and then concludes with a general observation
concerning the likelihood of a tort recovery.
a. The Five Actions
i. The FTC Rule
The disclosure document that Paula's gave Brown stated that the
company employed site selection experts, and it promised that Brown
would receive expert assistance. Swift was not an expert, however, and he
provided inept assistance. The document was misleading,2 5 and by
furnishing it to her, the company violated the Rule.26 Moreover, the
the negligence count in its complaint. Id. at 1264-65. The Third Circuit concluded that
the site selection agreement did not require California Smoothie to select a site or
negotiate a lease for J & R and that the relationship between the parties was "essentially
contractual." Id. at 1275. Courts are often reluctant to hold parties liable in tort for
careless performance of their contractual obligations. See, e.g., Princess Cruises v. Gen.
Elec., 950 F. Supp. 151, 155 (E.D. Va. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 143 F.3d 828 (4th
Cir. 1998) ("Almost any contract breach can be conceived of in terms of a negligent...
tort claim.... But to permit a party to a broken contract to proceed in tort where only
economic losses are alleged would eviscerate the most cherished virtue of contract law,
the power of the parties to allocate the risks of their own transactions."); Clark-Fitzpatrick
v. Long Island R.R., 516 N.E.2d 190, 193-94 (N.Y. 1987); 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 452 (Practitioner ed. 2001) ("[W]here commercial loss is suffered by parties to a
transaction, contract law is adequate to deal with the problem and also usually more
appropriate." (footnote omitted)). In J & R, the Third Circuit wrote that a party to a
contract can be liable in negligence if "the act complained of [is] the direct result of duties
voluntarily assumed . . . in addition to the mere contract." J & R, 31 F.3d at 1275
(quoting Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 221 (N.J.
1989)). California Smoothie had assumed a greater duty, and the jury's verdict for J & R
on the negligence count could stand. Id. The court did not specify which acts of
California Smoothie fell below the standard of ordinary care, so the case is not clearly on
all fours with Brown's. Yet she can argue that, by affirming its personnel's expertise and
promising expert assistance, Paula's assumed an obligation to provide expert site selection
assistance. Swift's lack of credentials and his sloppy work may have manifested a lack of
ordinary care on Paula's part, so there may be some prospect of a negligence recovery.
For a case in which the court dismissed a claim for negligence in site selection because
the parties had entered into a contract, see Banek v. Yogurt Ventures, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21453, at *17-18 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 1992). A negligence claim in Brown's case
would be based on Swift's site selection work, and not on the misleading disclosure
Brown received. A claim that the disclosure, as opposed to the site selection, was
negligent would fall under the heading of negligent misrepresentation. See infra notes
139-44 and accompanying text.
25 If Swift was the only "bad apple" among Paula's many site selection personnel, a fact
finder might not consider the company's affirmation of site selection expertise to have
been false. Except where otherwise indicated, however, this Paper is based on the
assumption that a sufficient number of those personnel lacked expertise that a fact finder
would conclude that the affirmation was false.
26 The assumption, of course, is that the sale of the franchise did not fall within one of the
Rule's exemptions. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.8 (2008).
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violation led directly to her losses. Her enforcement options, however, are
extremely limited.
(A) Paula's Violation of the Rule
The Rule requires disclosure of twenty-three "items," each
consisting of information concerning the franchisor or an aspect of the
working relationship the parties will have.27 Item 11, entitled "Franchisor's
Assistance, Advertising, Computer Systems, and Training," instructs
franchisors in relevant part as follows:
Disclose the franchisor's principal assistance and related
obligations of both the franchisor and franchisee as
follows. For each obligation, cite the section number of the
franchise agreement imposing the obligation. Begin by
stating the following sentence in bold type: "EXCEPT AS
LISTED BELOW, [THE FRANCHISOR] IS NOT REQUIRED TO
PROVIDE YOU WITH ANY ASSISTANCE."
(1) Disclose the franchisor's pre-opening
obligations to the franchisee, including any assistance in:
(i) Locating a site and negotiating the purchase or
lease of the site. If such assistance is provided, state:
(B) Whether the franchisor selects the site or
approves an area in which the franchisee selects a site. If
so, state further whether and how the franchisor must
approve a franchisee-selected site.28
Brown will argue that those provisions obligated Paula's to disclose
the assistance she would receive concerning site selection. In the Rule, the
word "disclose" means "to present all material facts accurately, clearly,
concisely, and in plain English., 29 The disclosure document's inaccurate
affirmation concerning site selection expertise constituted a failure to
disclose the assistance the company provided, and that failure violated the
Rule.
Paula's will respond with a narrow interpretation of Item 11.
Subsection (1)(i), on which Brown relies, requires disclosure of site
selection assistance only if the assistance is an obligation of the franchisor.
The language preceding subsection (1) makes clear that franchisor
obligations are created by the franchise agreement: "For each obligation,
27 See id. § 436.2, id. § 436.5.28 Id. § 436.5(k).
291d. § 436.1(d).
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cite the section number of the franchise agreement imposing the
obligation. 30  Paula's disclosure document described assistance to be
furnished at a time when the company and Brown had not yet executed
their Franchise Agreement. As a result, the assistance was not an obligation
of the company. The company was therefore not required to disclose the
assistance, and its inaccurate affirmation was not a violation.31
Brown can offer at least three responses. First, the FTC's
Statement of Basis and Purpose suggests that the narrow interpretation is
inappropriate. The Agency refers to the comments of a franchisee named
Lundquist, whose case resembles Brown's. Lundquist's comments appear
to have played an important role in prompting the drafting of the site
selection provisions.32 Lundquist reported that her franchise failed at least
in part because her franchisor did not follow its own criteria in selecting the
site for her store, which was in an urban location. She also stated that most
of the franchisor's stores were in suburban locations, and that the franchisor
lacked experience in siting stores in urban areas. Her testimony did not
reveal whether site selection in her case occurred before or after she signed
her franchise agreement. Moreover, none of the questions asked by the
FTC officials conducting the hearing indicated any interest in the timing of
the assistance.33 The Agency's reliance on her report thus appears to reflect
a belief in the need for accurate disclosure of site selection assistance
30 See supra text accompanying note 28.
31 Paula's can add that subsection 436.5(k)(2) also supports its narrow interpretation. That
subsection provides as follows:
Disclose the typical length of time between the earlier of the signing
of the franchise agreement or the first payment of consideration for
the franchise and the opening of the franchisee's business. Describe
the factors that may affect the time period, such as ability to obtain a
lease, financing or building permits, zoning and local ordinances,
weather conditions, shortages, or delayed installation of equipment,
fixtures, and signs.
16 C.F.R. § 436.5(k)(2) (2008). That language recognizes the possibility of the following
sequence: (1) payment of the first consideration, (2) obtaining a lease, and (3) execution
of a franchise agreement. In that sequence, any franchisor assistance in selecting a site
would necessarily occur before execution of a lease, and thus before the parties have
executed a franchise agreement. Paula's can argue that the agency, having recognized
that possibility, must have made a conscious choice to draft the portion of Item 11 quoted
in the text so as to require disclosure of site selection assistance only if the franchisor will
render the assistance after the parties have executed a franchise agreement. The limitation
could not have been inadvertent.
32 See Federal Trade Commission, Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,445, at 15,489 n.477
(March 30, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Statement of Basis and Purpose].
33 See Federal Trade Commission Workshop Concerning Proposed Revision of Franchise
Rule, Lundquist, ANPR, 22 Aug. 97 Tr. at 42-51,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/xscripts/822bus.pdf.
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regardless of when the assistance occurs in relation to the execution of a
franchise agreement.
Second, there is no good policy reason for applying Item 11 only to
assistance furnished after the execution of a franchise agreement. The harm
to Brown is every bit as severe as if she had first signed her Franchise
Agreement and then relied on Paula's false affirmation. As the FTC's
Statement of Basis and Purpose makes clear, prospective franchisees need
to be able to rely on all items of information provided in a disclosure
document: "The [FTC] has long recognized that the integrity of a
franchisor's disclosures is critical to prospective franchisees who rely on
such information in making their investment decision. For that reason,
disclosure documents must be complete, accurate, legible, and current."
34
The court should reject Paula's interpretation as unduly narrow and at odds
with the Rule's fundamental purpose.
Third, if the site selection assistance was not an obligation of
Paula's and therefore not required to be disclosed, then the company has
violated a different subsection of the Rule. Subsection 436.6(d) provides in
part: "Do not include any materials or information other than those required
or permitted by [the Rule] or by state law not preempted by [the Rule]. 35
Under both the Rule36 and state disclosure laws,37 disclosure documents
must consist of accurate information; franchisors are not permitted to
include false or misleading information concerning pre-agreement site
selection assistance.
(B) Enforcement
In theory, a franchisee in Brown's position could seek redress
under the FTC Rule in either or both of two ways. First, she could file a
complaint with the FTC, hoping that the Agency would act against Paula's
and she would receive some compensation as a result. Second, she could
sue the company for violating the Rule. If she complains to the Agency,
there is some chance of a recovery. If she sues the company for violating
the Rule, however, she will almost certainly lose.
By violating the Rule, Paula's committed an unfair trade practice
under the FTC Act,38 which authorizes Agency civil actions against
34 2007 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 32, at 15,534.
31 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(d) (2008).36 Id. § 436.1(d).
37 See, e.g., North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA) 2008
Franchise Registration and Disclosure Guidelines (Amended and Restated UFOC
Guidelines), http://www.nasaa.org/content/Files/2008UFOC.pdf. The Uniform Franchise
Registration Application included in the Guidelines requires the franchisor to certify that
"all material facts stated in the franchise disclosure document are accurate .... " Id. at 9.
38 The Rule provides in part:
In connection with the offer or sale of a franchise to be located in the
United States of America or its territories ... it is an unfair or
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violators.3 9 In such an action, the court can award compensation to a party
injured by the practice.4 °
For any of a variety of reasons, however, the FTC may decide not
to proceed. The Act requires that an enforcement proceeding be in the
public interest, 4' and the Agency may decide that the public interest does
not justify action in Brown's case. Resource constraints create a
deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act:
(a) For any franchisor to fail to furnish a prospective franchisee with
a copy of the franchisor's current disclosure document, as described
in Subparts C and D of [the Rule], at least 14 calendar-days before
the prospective franchisee signs a binding agreement with, or makes
any payment to, the franchisor or an affiliate in connection with the
proposed franchise sale.
16 C.F.R. § 436.2 (2008). The twenty-three disclosure items, including Item 11, are listed
in Subpart C, infra. See id., at § 436.5(k). In addition, section 436.6(a) provides in part:
"It is an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act for any
franchisor to fail to include the information and follow the instructions for preparing
disclosure documents set forth in Subpart C.. . of part 436." Id., at § 436.6(a).
The FTC Act provides in part: "If any person, partnership, or corporation
violates any rule under [the FTC Act] respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices...
then the [FTC] may commence a civil action against such person, partnership, or
corporation for relief under subsection (b) of this section in a United States district court
or in any court of competent jurisdiction of a State." 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(l) (2006).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b)(a)(l) (2006).
40 Subsection 57b(b) of the FTC Act provides:
The court in an action under subsection (a) of this section shall have
jurisdiction to grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress
injury to consumers or other persons, partnerships, and corporations
resulting from the rule violation .... Such relief may include, but
shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the
refund of money or return of property, the payment of damages, and
public notification respecting the rule violation ... except that
nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize the imposition of
any exemplary or punitive damages.
15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2006). See also I GARNER, SUpra note 6, § 5A:19, at 5A-31 ("The
FTC may... obtain consumer redress; in so doing, it is not necessary to show that every
consumer actually relied upon the misrepresentations, but only that the defendant made
misrepresentations which were the type that a reasonable and prudent person would rely
on." (footnote omitted)); David J. Meretta & Eric H. Karp, Regulation FD: Roadmap to
Better Relations Between Franchisors and Franchisees, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 117, 119
(2007).
41 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006). If the Agency does decide to proceed, a reviewing court will
probably not find that it has exceeded the public-interest limitation. Jeff Sovern, Private
Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule
Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 442 (1991).
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disincentive for enforcement actions except in cases involving many injured
parties and severe harms.42 Particularly if Paula's is a small franchise
system, the number of injured franchisees may be small. The aggregate
losses may not appear great even though Brown and some other franchisees
may have lost much of their net worth. Moreover, the company may not
have reaped a significant profit. Despite the harm to Brown and perhaps
also to other franchisees in the Paula's system, then, the Agency may well
conclude that the benefits of an enforcement proceeding would not justify
the costs that the proceeding would entail.43 If Brown then sues to compel
the Agency to act, she will almost certainly lose.44
42 See Sovern, supra note 41, at 448. In 1984, the FTC published a Franchise Rule
Enforcement Protocol which suggested that Agency enforcement was more likely to occur
in cases in which the violation(s) had injured numerous franchisees and greatly enriched
the franchisor. FTC Franchise Rule Enforcement Protocol, 16 C.F.R. § 14.17 (c)(1) to (4)
(1994) repealed by Federal Trade Commission, Administrative Interpretations, General
Policy Statements, and Enforcement Policy Statements, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,031, 42,031
(1995). In 1995, however, the Agency rescinded the protocol, along with other
interpretations, guidelines, and policy statements that [were] unnecessary, superfluous or
obsolete .... Federal Trade Commission, Administrative Interpretations, General Policy
Statements, and Enforcement Policy Statements, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,031, 42,031 (1995).
The Agency's explanation of the rescission does not make clear whether the emphasis on
large numbers of franchisees and large amounts of money had changed:
The [FTC] ... has investigated and filed in court the vast bulk of its
Franchise Rule enforcement actions since it published [the
rescinded] enforcement protocol in 1984. Thus, the protocol does
not reflect, fully and accurately, the [FTC's] present enforcement
policy. Moreover, the [FTC] currently is reviewing the Franchise
Rule under its ongoing regulatory review program.
... The Commission will consider whether it is necessary to issue an
updated version of the protocol to reflect current law, fact and policy
after it completes its regulatory review of the Franchise Rule.
Id. at 42,033 (footnote omitted). Although the agency has promulgated an updated rule, it
has not issued a new enforcement protocol. The United States General Accounting Office
interviewed FTC enforcement personnel and reported:
FTC staff told us that limited resources and other law enforcement
priorities prevented FTC from pursuing every meritorious complaint
and investigation involving franchises and business opportunities.
They said that FTC generally pursued those cases it believed would
have the greatest likelihood of financial recovery for franchise and
business opportunity purchasers or the greatest deterrent effect for
potential violators.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FRANCHISE RULE 2, GAO 01-776 (July 31, 2001).
43 An experienced franchise practitioner reports:
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Brown might also sue Paula's for violating the FTC Rule. Neither
the Rule 45 nor the FTC Act4 6 expressly authorizes suits by injured parties
against violators. For at least five reasons, however, Brown can urge the
court to imply a private action. First, she can invoke the bedrock notion
that where there is a wrong there must be a remedy; 47 Paula's wrongful
conduct injured her and she ought to receive compensation. If, for perfectly
rational and honorable reasons, the FTC decides not to proceed against
Like so many other governmental agencies, [the FTC] has been
given a gigantic mission, but limited resources to carry out its
mandate. Thus, triage has been the necessary strategy followed by
the FTC in the area of franchise sales regulation enforcement. It
looks for situations where the fraud is blatant and where there is
widespread injury to the public. The individual franchisee who has
been injured typically is left on his own to pursue justice.
Rupert M. Barkoff, Franchise Sales Regulation Reform: Taking the Noose Off the Golden
Goose, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 233,246 (2009). See also M. Thomas Arnold,
Taking Note of the Investment Aspects of Purchasing a Franchise: A Proposal for
Required Electronic Filing of Pre-sale Disclosure Documents, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus.
L.J. 209, 213 (2009) (characterizing FTC enforcement as "not very vigorous").
44 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1984). In Heckler, the Supreme Court concluded
that an administrative agency's decision not to bring an enforcement action "is a decision
generally committed to [the] agency's absolute discretion." Id. at 831. Title 5, section
702 of the United States Code provides for judicial review of administrative agency
action. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). Under section 701(a)(2), however, courts cannot review
agency decisions that are "committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)
(2006). The Court concluded that "agency decisions not to undertake enforcement actions
should be presumed immune from judicial review under § 70 1(a)." Heckler, supra, at
832. The presumption of immunity may be rebutted, the Court wrote, if the substantive
statute under which the agency acts "has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in
exercising its enforcement powers." Id. at 832-33. The question in Brown's case,
therefore, is whether the FTC Act provides guidelines for the FTC to follow in deciding
whether to bring enforcement actions. The answer appears to be that the FTC Act does
not do so. See Sovern, supra note 41, at 441 n.21 ("Not only can consumers not sue under
the FTC Act, but also consumers also have no recourse when the [FTC] declines to bring
a case."). See also Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of
Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 16
(1985) ("The [FTC] has almost total independence in deciding to commence cases.
Consumers and competitors may request that the FTC begin investigations or
prosecutions, but an FTC decision to reject these suggestions is not reviewable."
(footnotes omitted)). For general discussion of judicial review of agency inaction, see
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 13.11 (2d ed.
2001).
41 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1 to .11 (2008).
46 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
41 See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the
Existence of Implied Private Rights ofAction, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 861, 864 (1996)
(In the early 1800s, courts endorsed that notion: "Since there was a remedy for all wrongs,
if Congress did not provide for that remedy, the courts should and did.").
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Paula's and Brown has no cause of action under the Rule, she may be left
with no remedy, and the result will be an injustice.4 8
Second, Congress may well have passed the FTC Act in the
expectation that courts would imply private actions to supplement Agency
enforcement. The FTC Act became effective in 1914, at a time when at
least some American courts were generally willing to imply private
actions.49 Congress, which must have been aware of that practice, failed to
include any language forbidding implication. 50 Brown's argument is more
forceful than it would have been if the climate in 1914 had been
inhospitable to implication.
Third, courts have recognized implied private actions under other,
arguably analogous federal laws,5' including Rule 1Ob-5,52 promulgated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 53 Just as section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
are designed to combat deception in the sale of securities, the FTC Rule is
designed to combat deception in the sale of franchises.54
48 See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement
ofRights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 665, 677-81 (1987) (explaining why
legal rights require remedies).
49 See id., at 675-77; H. Miles Foy III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and
Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 501, 546
(1986). See also Margaret V. Sachs, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction for Implied Rule lOb-
5 Actions: The Emperor Has No Clothes, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 559, 572 (1988) (By 1934,
implication of private actions "had been largely confined to state statutes and local
ordinances.").
50 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
51 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (finding a private action under section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006), and Rule 14a-9, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2008)); H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 423-24
(1st Cir. 1973) (implied private action under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2006)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 374-88 (1982) (implied private action under several sections of the Commodity
Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 27f (2006)).
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2007).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - nn (2006). See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) ("It is now established that a private right of action is
implied under § lob").
14 Indeed, prospective franchisees are arguably in greater need of protection than buyers of
securities:
[T]he franchisee often will be required to make a huge investment in
the franchised business. Even when the investment made is not so
large, it may represent most of the purchasers' net worth. A
purchaser of common shares often invests a smaller percentage of
his or her wealth in any particular company and, as a result, gains a
certain amount of protection against loss by virtue of his or her
ability to acquire a diversified portfolio. In addition, a purchaser of
common shares in a public company generally has an exit; he or she
can easily sell the shares. A franchisee cannot so easily exit the
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Fourth, in its Statement of Basis and Purpose, the FTC has
explicitly endorsed implied private actions under the Rule:
The [FTC] believes that the courts should and will
hold that any person injured by a violation of this rule has a
right of action against the violator, under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976),
and this rule. The existence of such a right is necessary to
protect the members of the class for whose benefit the
statute was enacted and the rule is being promulgated, is
consistent with the legislative intent of the Congress in
enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended,
and is necessary to the enforcement scheme established by
the Congress in that Act and to the [FTC's] own
enforcement efforts.55
Although the Agency's position has been public knowledge since 1979,
moreover, Congress has not acted to prohibit the implication of a private
action under the Rule.
Fifth, private enforcement of the Rule is appropriate even if private
enforcement of section five of the FTC Act is inappropriate. Section five
provides, in relevant part, that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. 56 That highly general phrasing
arguably militates against recognition of a private action to enforce the
section in the absence of a more detailed rule.57 A private action could
create a risk of litigation that is both vexatious to franchisors and not in the
franchise system. Thus, it may be more critical for the purchaser of
a franchise to make an informed investment decision than the
purchaser of common shares.
Arnold, supra note 43, at 230-31 (footnotes omitted).
" The quoted language appears in the Statement of Basis and Purpose that accompanied
the original Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rule, which the Agency promulgated
in 1978. See Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Basis and Purpose Relating to
Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business
Opportunity Ventures, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,621, at 59,723 (Dec. 21, 1978). The 2007
Statement of Basis and Purpose, issued with the revised Rule, does not address private
actions, but it does provide that the original statement "remains valid, except to the
extent of any conflict with the final amended Rule." 2007 Statement ofBasis and
Purpose, supra note 32, at 15,449. If there is a conflict, the 2007 statement "supersedes"
the old one. Id. Because nothing in the revised Rule conflicts with the Agency's
endorsement of private actions, the endorsement continues.
56 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
57 See Sovern, supra note 41, at 440-52 (contrasting consumer actions under state Little
FTC Acts with Agency actions under the FTC Act).
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public interest. 58 Some franchisees might use the section as a harassment
tool, forcing their franchisors to defend against-and the courts to
consider-essentially baseless claims of unfairness or deception. In at least
in some cases, courts might respond by unduly restricting the section's
scope. 59 Even if case law eventually defined unfairness and deception in
franchise sales, the process could take many years.
Despite the generality of section five of the FTC Act, however, a
private action under the Rule would not create an undue risk of vexatious
litigation. The Rule contains both a detailed set of requirements for
franchise disclosures60 and instructions for preparing 61 and updating
62
disclosure documents. The Statement of Basis and Purpose includes a
detailed section-by-section analysis of the Rule.63 The Agency has also
published a Compliance Guide, which explains aspects of the revised Rule
that differ from earlier requirements.64 The Guide includes sample
disclosures that illustrate compliance. 65 With respect to site selection
'8 See id. Sovern points to Geismar v. Abraham & Strauss, 439 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y.
Dist. Ct. 1981), in which a newspaper published an advertisement for a set of dishes.
The newspaper erred, and the published price was substantially less than the store's
actual retail price. The store refused to sell at the lower price to a consumer who had
seen the advertisement. The consumer sued the store and was able to recover statutory
damages under New York's Little FTC Act. Geismar, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 1006-08. As
Sovern notes, there was no way the store could have prevented the deception. Arguably,
then, there is no deterrence rationale for the holding, although perhaps the store could
have recovered its loss from the newspaper. Sovern, supra note 41, at 452. Moreover,
the consumer may have been inconvenienced, but she was not injured. The breadth of
the statute troubled the judge:
The implications of this construction of the statute are awesome.
Even running corrective advertising will not provide a defense by the
terms of the section, other than to the extent it establishes that a
person was not deceived or misled. Very little in the way of reliance
on the misleading advertisement need be shown. Possible liability
for a mistake in advertisements in [a] newspaper ... widely
disseminated could be virtually limitless. But, it does seem that this
is the mandated result. [New York's Little FTC Act] may be in need
of legislative review and revision.
Geismar, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 1008. The current version of the statute is essentially the same
as the one that controlled in the case. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 350-a, 350-e
(McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2008).
59 See Sovern, supra note 41, at 457-62.
60 See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5 (2008).
61 Id § 436.6.
62 Id. § 436.7.
63 2007 Statement of Basis & Purpose, supra note 32, at 15,453-538.
64 Federal Trade Commission, Franchise Rule-2008 Compliance Guide,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/franchise/bus70.pdf (2008).
65 Id. passim. The Guide does note that its "advice is not binding on the [Agency]." Id. at
ii. It also notes that franchisors can consult "'Amended Franchise Rule FAQ's' on the
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assistance, for example, the sample disclosure in the Guide is much more
carefully conceived and phrased than the one Paula's included in its
disclosure document. In the sample, the franchisor discloses both its site
selection criteria and the site selection services it provides. The franchisor
66xaiainoth
makes no claim of site selection expertise. A careful examination of the
sample provision might well have led Paula's to omit any claim of expertise
from its disclosure document and to include specifics regarding its site
selection criteria and the services it would provide. Brown might then have
been less inclined to rely on Swift's work, and she might have declined to
buy a franchise to be operated at the inappropriate site he approved.
Despite the force of Brown's arguments, she will almost certainly
lose if she sues to enforce the FTC Rule against Paula's. The Supreme
Court is currently much less inclined to imply private actions than courts
were in earlier eras. Erwin Chemerinsky writes that "[u]nder current law, it
appears that the ... Court will establish private actions only if affirmative
evidence shows that Congress intended to allow such suits."
67
Chemerinsky explains that both separation of powers and federalism
concerns underlie the Court's current approach.68 Writing for the Court in
2001, Justice Scalia emphasized the limited nature of the Court's role:
FTC's web site... and staff opinions that have been issued in response to specific
requests regarding particular fact situations." Id. at i.
66 The sample disclosures are by a hypothetical franchisor named Belmont, which
franchises muffler shops. The sample concerning site selection assistance describes what
Belmont will do before the prospective franchisee ("you" in the sample) opens his or her
business:
Assist you in selecting a business site .... You select your business
site within your exclusive area subject to our approval. Your site
must be at least 8000 square feet, must have parking spaces, and
must have an average of 250 cars per hour driving by. Although not
required by the Franchise Agreement to do so, Belmont assists in site
selection by telling you the number of new car registrations,
population density, traffic patterns, and the proximity of the
proposed site to other Belmont Muffler Shops. We must approve or
disapprove your site within 20 days after we receive notice of the
proposed location.
Id., Sample Item 11, at 69.
67 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3, at 388 (4h ed. 2003). See also
Stabile, supra note 47, at 873.
68 Id., at § 6.3, at 380. See also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761, 773 (2008). In Stoneridge, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "[t]he
determination of who can seek a remedy has significant consequences for the reach of
federal power" and quoted from an earlier opinion in which the Court had explained that
the "requirement of congressional intent 'reflects a concern, grounded in separation of
powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of remedies for
violations of statutes."' Id.
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Implicit in our discussion thus far has been a
particular understanding of the genesis of private causes of
action. Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of
action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.
The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has
passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create
not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory
intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a
cause of action does not exist and courts may not create
one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy
matter, or how compatible with the statute.69
The Court's role, Scalia emphasized, does not depend on the prevailing
judicial view of private actions at the time of enactment of the statute in
question. 70 The contemporary "legal context matters only to the extent it
clarifies [statutory] text., 71 The Supreme Court reaffirmed those views in a
2008 opinion by Justice Kennedy.72
In determining congressional intent, the Court has reasoned that
"[s]tatutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals
protected create 'no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular
class of persons."'' 73 Because the FTC Act and the Rule focus on the
franchisor, they arguably do not imply an intent to confer rights on
franchisees.
As early as 1984, a federal district court adopted essentially the
Supreme Court's current view and rejected a private action under the FTC
Rule. In Freedman v. Meldy s, 74 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that there was no reason to
believe that Congress had intended to give a private action to parties injured
by violations of the FTC Act.75 Indeed, there was evidence that some
members of Congress believed the FTC had become unduly aggressive in
its rule making.76
The court in Freedman noted that, in earlier opinions denying
private actions under the FTC Act, courts had expressed the fear that
private enforcement would compromise Agency enforcement. After the
decisions in those earlier cases, however, the Agency promulgated the Rule
69Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (citations omitted).
70 Id. at 287-88.
71 Id. at 288.
72 See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct., at 772-73 (2008). For criticism of the Court's approach, see
Stabile, supra note 47, at 877-85. Stabile argues that congressional intent should be only
one of the factors courts take into account in deciding whether to recognize private actions
under federal statutes. Id. at 901-08.
73 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 289 (citing Cal. v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)).
74 587 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 661.
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and publicized its view that the success of its own enforcement efforts
depended on private enforcement. 7' The Freedman court appreciated both
the force of that argument and the analogy to securities laws under which
courts have recognized implied private actions:
[W]hat effect does the FTC's expressed view, that there is
a private cause of action under the new regulations, have
on prior court decisions as to congressional intent? The
question is particularly interesting in light of the following:
[the holding in a leading case which held that there was no
private action] relied in large part upon the rationale that
private enforcement of the [FTC] Act would upset the
FTC's enforcement scheme. The FTC, under the new
regulations, opines that enforcement of its new rules will be
ineffective without private enforcement. The new rules are
analogous to the Securities Exchange Commission Rules
on disclosure which have been held to be enforceable by
private right of action. Disclosure rules are precisely the
type of rules difficult to enforce by agency action alone.78
Despite the force of those arguments, the court was "constrained" to reject
the private action because there was no evidence that Congress had adopted
the FTC's view. 79 The court also rejected the argument that it could imply
a private action under the Rule even if there was none under the FTC Act.
The Supreme Court had "explicitly rejected arguments that the rules
adopted under a statute can themselves provide the source of an implied
damages remedy if the statute itself cannot." 80 As a result, the Freedman
court dismissed the franchisee's complaint for violation of the FTC Rule.
Other courts have agreed, 81 and today there is little or no chance that Brown
could hold Paula's liable under the Rule.82
17 Id. at 660.
7 8 1d. at 660.79 Freedman, 587 F. Supp. at 660, 662.
80 Id. at 661-62. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that point in 2001: "regulations, if valid
and reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself, and it is therefore meaningless
to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute."
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284 (2001) (citations omitted); id. at 291 ("Language
in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory text
created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not.").
81 See Mercy Health Sys. v. Metro. Partners Realty, No. 02-1015, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14080 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2002); Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, 717 F. Supp. 368 (D.
Md. 1989); Days Inn of Am. Franchising v. Windham, 699 F. Supp. 1581 (N.D. Ga.
1988); Mon-Shore Mgmt. v. Family Media, Nos. 83 Civ. 2013, 83 Civ. 2014, 83 Civ.
5548, 83 Civ. 5550, 1985 WL 4845 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1985).82 See JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES § 9.1 (6hed. 2004) (Notwithstanding the Agency's stance favoring private
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ii. Negligence Per Se
Brown can argue that Paula's violation of the FTC Rule constitutes
negligence per se under state law. She will argue that the Rule establishes a
standard of reasonableness in preparing franchise disclosures and that the
company's failure to meet that standard constituted negligence as a matter
of law. Depending on the jurisdiction, she may need to make a less
ambitious argument: that evidence of the violation should go to the fact
finder. If the court agrees with either argument, she may be able to achieve
essentially the same result as if there had been a private action under the
Rule.83
Brown can cite section 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
entitled "When Standard of Conduct Defined by Legislation or Regulation
Will Be Adopted":
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a
reasonable [person] the requirements of a legislative
enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is
found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the
one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is
invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm
which has resulted, and
actions, "courts have consistently held that it is for Congress and the courts, not the FTC,
to decide if there is a private right of action under an FTC rule, and since there is no
evidence that Congress changed its mind, the FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose should
be given no effect." (footnote omitted)). The authors cite cases in support of the
observation that "judicial precedent, with only a few exceptions, indicates that there is no
3rivate right of action under the FTC Act." Id. (footnote omitted).
See James M. Beck & John A. Valentine, Challenging the Viability of FDCA-Based
Causes ofAction in the Tort Context: The Orthopedic Bone Screw Experience, 55 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 389, 405-06 (2000) ("Aside from the effect upon federal question jurisdiction,
there is little to distinguish between a claim of negligence per se and an implied private
right of action; they are essentially two means of applying a statute to achieve the same
result." (footnote omitted)); Stabile, supra note 47, at 865 n. 19 ("Although the negligence
per se claim is not the same as an implied cause of action-in the former the cause of
action is a state law tort claim, whereas the latter is a federal statutory cause of action-
the two claims get the plaintiff to the same place.").
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(d) to protect that interest against the particular
hazard from which the harm results.84
The purpose of the FTC Rule is to protect the class of prospective
franchisees, which includes Brown. The Rule is designed to protect her
interest in full and accurate disclosure-an interest that Paula's has
invaded. The Agency promulgated the Rule to protect that interest from the
harm that results from the purchase of a franchise that cannot be made
profitable, and Brown has suffered that harm. Moreover, Paula's
misinformation exposed her to the hazards of an uninformed decision about
whether to join the company's system-the very hazards that the Agency
had in mind.85 The court should therefore adopt the Rule's requirements as
the standard of care for purposes of Brown's negligence claim.
At least one court has held that a violation of a disclosure
requirement can constitute negligence per se. In Alaface v. National
Investment Co.,86 the seller of a building lot in an Arizona subdivision was
statutorily required, before offering the lot for sale, to send a notice to the
State Real Estate Commissioner. The statute required that the notice
contain a "true statement" of the water and other utilities that would service
the lot.87 After examining the subdivision, the Commissioner would issue a
public report which would authorize the sale and set forth the information
the seller had provided. The statute required the seller to give a copy of the
report to the buyer.
The seller of a lot which had no water supply failed to send a notice
to the Commissioner. The buyer, who, as the seller knew, planned to build a
house on the lot, discovered the lack of water only after buying the
property, and sued the seller.88 The Arizona appellate court held that the
seller had violated the notice requirement, but that the only statutory
remedy was rescission.
8 9
The buyer was, however, entitled to recover damages under the
common law for negligence per se. Observing that Arizona courts followed
the Restatement section, 90 the court found that the buyer's case came within
its provisions. The disclosure statute was designed "to protect members of
the public from being misled into purchasing land that is unusable or unsafe
for residential purposes." 91 Moreover, the Restatement illustrations made
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1977). See also id at § 285 ("The standard
of conduct of a reasonable [person] may be... adopted by the court from a legislative
enactment or an administrative regulation which does not so provide .... ).
85 See 2007 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 32, at 15,447, 15,450-52.
86 892 P.2d 1375 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
871d. at 1381.
81 d. at 1377-78.
'
9Id. at 1381-83.
90Id. at 1385.
' Alaface, 892 P.2d at 1385-86.
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clear that negligence per se could be premised on economic harm as
opposed to personal injury. Violation of what the dissenting judge termed a
"safety statute" was not required.92
Courts in other states may reject the Arizona courts' view for one
or both of two reasons. First, Paula's can argue with some force that the
Restatement section contemplates negligence liability based on violations
of statutes or regulations designed to enhance public safety.93 As a result, a
court would have to strain in order to apply the section to a case like
Brown's. In Lowdermilk v. Vescovo Building & Realty,94 for example,
buyers of a home in Missouri sued the seller's brokers for negligence per
92 Id. at 1386-87. See also I DOBBS, supra note 24, § 134, at 318 ("Even statutes
regulating economic relations of the parties, such as those requiring disclosure of specific
information, have been held to be the basis of a negligence per se claim." (footnote
omitted) (citing Alaface v. Nat'l Inv. Co., 892 P.2d 1375 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)). In
Lombardo v. Albu, 4 P.3d 395 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). however, the court declined to
permit a real estate seller to base a claim for damages on a regulation that imposed a duty
of disclosure on a real estate broker acting for the buyer. The court explained:
[T]he existence of an administrative regulation does not necessarily
mean that a duty exists that, if breached, gives rise to liability in tort.
The regulations at issue are similar to the Rules of Professional
Conduct regulating attorneys, which were "not designed to be a basis
for civil liability," but to "provide guidance to lawyers and to
provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary
agencies."
Id. at 397. "The reason that courts do not impose tort liability in every instance in which
someone violates an administrative regulation is this: The policies implicated when
considering tort liability can differ from those in deciding regulatory policy." Id at 399.
Lombardo demonstrates that a violation of a disclosure regulation will not necessarily be
a basis for negligence liability in Arizona. A factor that militated against imposition of a
duty in that case, however, was the conflict of interest the duty might create for the real
estate broker. Id. That factor is not present in Brown's case.
93 Dan Dobbs writes that "[t]he negligence per se rule is commonly adopted in motor
vehicle cases." I DOBBS, supra note 24, § 134. He adds:
Although courts refuse to adopt the statutory standard in some cases,
and especially when the statute imposes certain affirmative
obligations, the negligence per se rule is applied to a wide variety of
statutory violations. A statute requires a lifeguard at a pool, lights on
a ship, buildings constructed to specific requirements, safety devices
for protection of construction workers, smoke detectors for the
protection of tenants; violation is negligence per se. Statutes
regulating sales or dispensation of dangerous items like guns and
alcohol may also sometimes furnish grounds for a negligence claim
by persons injured as a result of the sale.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
9491 S.W.3d 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
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se, and a Missouri appellate court rejected their claim. The buyers alleged
that the brokers had violated a statute that required disclosure of "all
adverse material facts" 95 concerning the property of which the brokers were
or should have been aware. Defects that should have been disclosed led to
losses, the buyers claimed, so the brokers were liable for negligence per se.
The court disagreed. The statute fell "outside the class of safety statutes on
which negligence per se is ordinarily based., 96 That doctrine had
"traditionally arisen in cases involving personal injury and physical injury
to property," and not in "cases which involve[d] damage to economic
interests. 97 Moreover, the statute expressly provided that it did not limit
"civil actions for negligence, fraud, misrepresentation or breach of
contract."98 The legislature had not intended, the court reasoned, to "allow
a plaintiff to collect damages for fraud, misrepresentation, or failure to
disclose without proving all of the traditional elements of those claims." 99
Second, Paula's can argue that Brown's attempt to use the FTC
Rule as a basis for a state common law claim should fail under the
Supremacy Clause in the Federal Constitution. If the Rule violation
constitutes negligence per se under state law, the state has effectively
created a private action in the teeth of the federal cases holding that no such
action exists. 10 0 Paula's can cite Sanford Street Local Development Corp.
v. Textron, 0 1 in which a federal district court refused to recognize a
violation of the federal Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) as the basis
of a negligence per se action for damages under Michigan law. Congress
had provided for injunctive remedies but not for damages under the TSCA,
and the federal scheme preempted the state law:
9' Id. at 628 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.730.3 (Supp. 1998)).96 
Id. at 628.97 Id. See also Foy, supra note 49, at 568 ("State courts seem to have special difficulty
with cases that lack the usual earmarks of negligence cases.").
98 Id., at 629 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.840 (1998)).99 Lowdermilk, 91 S.W.3d at 629 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.840 (1998)).
1oo Cf Louis Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1275-76
(1960). Loss argues in favor of concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction over
implied private actions under section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(2006). If federal and state courts shared jurisdiction, he writes,
the question whether the private right of action is created by the
federal common law or the state common law would be a highly
interesting jurisprudential problem, but nothing more; for the state
courts would merely be instruments for the application of federal
law, and any different notions worked out under state tort concepts
would have to yield under the supremacy clause in any case.
Id.
'0 768 F. Supp. 1218 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
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Although a violation of a statute will not
necessarily lead to a verdict for the plaintiff, it is
nonetheless clear that the success of a cause of action
alleging negligence per se is largely controlled by the
existence of such an event. As such, a negligence per se
claim alleging a violation of the TSCA is little different
than an implied right of action under the TSCA for money
damages. Since the latter is not available because of
Congress' desire to provide aggrieved parties with only
equitable remedies, this Court finds that the former is
preempted as well. Otherwise, the common law of
Michigan would be in direct conflict, on its face, with
federal law, a situation prohibited by the Supremacy
Clause.1 °2
The court in Brown's case should arguably reject her negligence per se
claim for the same reason.
10 3
In some cases, however, courts have held that violations of federal
law can constitute negligence per se under state law. Consider Lowe v.
General Motors Corp.,°4 in which evidence of a violation of the federal
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act'0 5 was evidence of
negligence per se in a state wrongful death action. The federal district court
hearing the case on the basis of diversity-and not federal question-
jurisdiction, concluded that there was "no private remedy for negligence
under [that Act]. 10 6 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit did not disagree but held
that the violation could nevertheless provide the basis for a negligence per
se action under Alabama law:
This court has often held that violation of a Federal
law or regulation can be evidence of negligence, and even
evidence of negligence per se.
The mere fact that the law which evidences
negligence is Federal while the negligence action itself is
brought under State common law does not mean that the
102 Id. at 1224. The court reached its conclusion despite the following language in the
section of the TSCA that provided for injunctive enforcement: "Nothing in this section
shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute
or common law to seek enforcement of this chapter or any rule or order under this chapter
or to seek other relief." 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(3) (2006).
103 See Beck & Valentine, supra note 83, at 409-16 (describing a majority rule rejecting
negligence per se and a minority rule endorsing the doctrine in the context of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000 & Supp. 2005)).
'04 624 F.2d 1373 (5h Cir. 1980).
105 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30170 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
"' Lowe, 624 F.2d at 1378.
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state law claim metamorphoses into a private right of
action under Federal regulatory law.
10 7
At least one other court has reached the same conclusion.
10 8
In sum, Brown may or may not be able to sue for negligence per se.
Her ability or inability to do so will depend primarily on her jurisdiction. 10 9
iii. State Disclosure Laws
Fourteen states have enacted statutes requiring franchisor
disclosures to prospective franchisees. 1 0 One other state maintains an
administrative regulation requiring disclosure."' Twelve of the fourteen
states also require registration of disclosure documents.'"2 If Brown's case
is governed by the law of one of the fifteen, Paula's may have violated not
only the FTC Act but also the applicable state disclosure law. Each of the
laws gives a franchisee injured by a violation a private action for
damages," 13 and in some states the franchisee may also be entitled to
'
0 7 Id. at 1379.
08 See Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 964-65 (E.D. Wis.),
opinion and order amended 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (Wisconsin follows
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286; violation of federal regulation concerning oral
contraceptives can constitute negligence per se.).
109 Cf William W. Watts, Common Law Remedies in Alabama for Contamination of Land,
29 CUMS. L. REV. 37, 58 (1998) ("Some courts have allowed claims of negligence per se
for land contamination caused by violation of environmental statutes. Other courts,
however, have refused to recognize a negligence per se action for violation of
environmental regulations .... ").
"0 CAL. CORP. CODE § 31119 (West Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482E-3 (West
2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/5(2) (West Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-
2.5-9(2) (LexisNexis 1999); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 14-223 (LexisNexis 2004);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 445.1508 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
80C.06(5) (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 683(8) (McKinney 1996); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 51-19-08(6) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-8(a) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 37-5B-5B-17(l) (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-563(e) (2006); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.100.080 (West 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 553.27(4) (West 2006).
"I OR. ADMIN. R. § 441-325-020 (2008).
112 CAL. CORP. CODE § 31110 (West 2006); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/10 (West
1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.5-9(1) (LexisNexis 1999); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. §
14-214 (LexisNexis 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.02 (West 1999); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 683(1) (McKinney 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-19-03 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
19-28.1-5 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-5B-4 to -5 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
560 (Supp. 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.020 (West 1999); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
553.21 (West 2006).
113 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31300 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482E-9(b) (West
2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/26 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.5-28
(LexisNexis 1999); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 14-227 (LexisNexis 2004); MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 445.1531(1) (LexisNexis 2006); MJNN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.17(1)
(West Supp. 2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 691(1) (McKinney 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §
51-19-12(1) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-21(a) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-
5B-49 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-571 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.100.190(2) (West 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 553.51(2) (West 2006).
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rescission.'1 4 Some of the statutes also enable aggrieved franchisees to
obtain attorneys' fees in certain circumstances.' 1 5 One advantage of the
statutory action over a common law fraud action may be that in the
statutory action Brown will not need to prove scienter.116
Even if Brown's jurisdiction is one of the fifteen, however, her
franchise purchase may have been exempt from the disclosure law's
coverage. 17 There may be a provision in the Franchise Agreement stating
that she and Paula's have chosen to be governed by the law of a different
jurisdiction."l 8 Moreover, she may be unable to recover damages if Paula's
offers her rescission of the contract and restitution of the funds she has
In Oregon, an administrative regulation, OR. ADMIN. R. § 441-325-020(4)
(2008), provides that failure to provide a disclosure statement, as required by OR.
ADMIN. R. § 441-325-020(1) (2008), is a violation of the state statute which requires
truth in franchise sales, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650.020(1) (West Supp. 2008). The
statute gives the franchisee a private action against the franchisor. OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 650.020(1) (West Supp. 2008). The damages allowed under the statute are "any
amounts to which the franchisee would be entitled upon an action for a rescission." Id. §
650.020(3).
114 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31300 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482E-9(b) (West
2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/26 (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN. § 14-227(c)(1)
(LexisNexis 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 445.1531(1) (LexisNexis 2006); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 80C.17(1) (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 691(1) (McKinney
1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-19-12(1) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-21(a) (2006);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-5B-49 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.190(2) (West
1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 553.5 1(1) (West 2006).
See also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650.020(3) (West Supp. 2008) ("The
franchisee may recover any amounts to which the franchisee would be entitled upon an
action for a rescission.") and OR. ADMIN. R. § 441-325-020(4) (2008).
1'5 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482E-9(c) (West 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
705/26 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.5-28 (LexisNexis 1999); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 80C.17(3) (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 691(1) (McKinney 1996);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-19-12(3) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-21 (a) (2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-5B-49 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-571(a) (2006); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.100.190(3) (West 1999). See also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650.020(3)
(West Supp. 2008).
116 See 2 GARNER, supra note 6, § 9:12 ("Under state franchise disclosure statutes, the
scienter requirement may be relaxed."). For discussion of the scienter requirement in
common law fraud actions, see infra text at notes 137-38.
"' See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31100 to 31109.1 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 482E-4 (West 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/9 (West 1999) (administrator may
grant exemptions). See generally I GARNER, supra note 6, §§ 5A:22 to 29.
1'8 See, e.g., 3 GARNER, supra note 6, § 17:23 ("Where there are no statutory provisions
against choice of law clauses, such clauses have been widely enforced in a broad range of
franchise and dealer relationships."). As applied to the state disclosure law, however, the
clause may be unenforceable. See Holland, et al., supra note 24, at 16 (noting that many
of the disclosure statutes contain "anti-waiver" provisions). For general discussion of the
effectiveness of choice of law clauses, see id. at 35-38.
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paid," 9 or she may be held to have waived her rights by retaining the
franchise for a time after realizing that the site was unsuitable.
iv. State Unfair Trade Practices Acts
Another possibility for Brown is to claim that Paula's violation of
the FTC Rule is a violation of the state unfair trade practices or "Little FTC
Act" in her jurisdiction. If she does, the first question will be whether she
qualifies for protection under that Act.1 20 Jonathan Sheldon and Carolyn
Carter write that "[c]ourts usually find that the sale of a franchise to a
franchisee is covered by [the state Little FTC Act]," but also that there are
contrary decisions.' 21 In many states, Little FTC Acts protect only
consumers, 22 and define a consumer as a person who buys goods or
services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 12 3 Brown
arguably bought her franchise for business purposes, so the court may
regard her as a businessperson rather than a consumer.124 If so her
jurisdiction's Little FTC Act may not apply.
1"9 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 445.1531(2) (LexisNexis 2006). See generally I
GARNER, supra note 6, § 5A:42.
120 See generally 62B AM. JUR. 2D Private Franchise Contracts § 164 (2005 & Supp.
2008).
121 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 82, § 2.2.9.2.
122 See ROBERT M. LANGER ET AL., 12 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES, UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES App. K, at K-9 to K-I 1 (Supp. 2007) (table entitled "Types of Conduct
Prohibited by and Availability of Private Remedies in State Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices Acts").
123 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 82, § 2.1.8.1.
124 See 2 GARNER, supra note 6, § 9:34, at 9-117 ("Some [Little FTC] acts limit relief to
consumers, which may be construed to exclude franchisees, almost certainly franchisors,
and sometimes all corporations." (footnote omitted)). In J & R Ice Cream v. California
Smoothie Licensing, 31 F.3d 1259, 1270-74 (3rd Cir. 1994), the Third Circuit rejected a
franchisee's claim of a violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:8-2 (West 1989):
We conclude that even where franchises or distributorships are
available to the public at large in the same sense as are trucks, boats
or computer peripherals, they are not covered by the Consumer
Fraud Act because they are businesses, not consumer goods or
services. They never are purchased for consumption. Instead, they
are purchased for the present value of the cash flows they are
expected to produce in the future and.., bear no resemblance to the
commodities and services listed in the statutory definition of
"merchandise" or the rules promulgated by the Division of
Consumer Affairs.
Id. at 1274 (footnotes omitted). But see Kavky v. Herbalife Int'l of Am., 820 A.2d 677
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding that the New Jersey Little FTC Act does apply
to the sale of a franchise).
See also, e.g., Holland, et al., supra note 24, at 20-21, 31-32; Dennis D. Palmer,
Franchises: Statutory and Common Law Causes of Action in Missouri Revisited, 62
UMKC L. REV. 471, 497 (1994). Palmer writes:
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If Brown can sue, the next question will be whether she can prove a
violation. Sheldon and Carter maintain that a violation of the FTC Rule
should be a "per se... violation" of an applicable Little FTC Act.
125
Florida's Act states that a violation "may be based upon... [a]ny law,
statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance which proscribes unfair methods of
competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or practices."
'1 26
In some states, a violation of the FTC Rule is prima facie evidence of a
violation of the Little FTC Act. 127 In some cases, however, courts have
declined to find per se violations.1
28
If the Rule violation alone is insufficient, Brown may need to prove
scienter,129 although the court may interpret that requirement "narrowly.'
' 30
Under the [Missouri Little FTC Act], private civil actions for
persons injured as a result of unlawful practices are limited to
transactions "primarily for personal, family or household purposes."
This limitation probably precludes a private right of action for
practices affecting franchising arrangements because franchising
involves the purchase of goods and services primarily for
commercial purposes and not for consumer purposes.
Id. (footnote omitted). A court's view of a franchisee as a businessperson rather than a
consumer may also increase the likelihood of enforcement of a waiver of the protections
of a Little FTC act. See Holland et al., supra note 24, at 39.
For criticism of contract law's dichotomy between merchants and consumers,
see Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295 (2005). Garvin argues that the dichotomy disadvantages
small businesses. The law treats them as equals in their dealings with larger businesses.
In their dealings with consumers, however, it requires them to "give protections based on
asymmetries that may not exist." Id. at 297. The law thus "may effectively subject small
businesses to a regulatory tax-a peculiar tax indeed, if small businesses are, as we are
told, the driving forces of our economy." Id. (footnote omitted).
121 SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 82, § 5.13.1.1.
126 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.203(a) (West Supp. 2008).
127 2 GARNER, supra note 6, § 9:36, at 9-136.
128 See, e.g., Symes v. Bahama Joe's, Inc., No. 87-0963-Z, 1988 WL 92462, at *5 (D.
Mass. Aug. 12, 1988) ("Although [the Massachusetts Little FTC Act] allows courts, in
construing unfair or deceptive acts or practices, to be guided by [sic] Federal Trade
Commission's and Federal Courts' interpretations of § 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act, this does
not mean that a violation of the Franchising Rules, ipsofacto, leads to a violation of [the
Massachusetts Little FTC Act]."); LeBlanc v. Belt Ctr., Inc., 509 So.2d 134, 137 (La.
App. 1987) ("We agree with the trial court that the failure to comply with the FTC
disclosure regulations did not constitute an unfair trade practice.").
129 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 82, § 4.2.4.2; Victor E. Schwartz & Cary
Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1,
20 (2005). In Brennan v. Carvel Corp., 929 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1991), Carvel represented
that its site selection personnel were experts, but the employee who approved a site for the
Brennans was not an expert. Id. at 803-05. As a result, the Brennans' store failed and
they sued Carvel. Id. at 805. Despite the misrepresentation, the First Circuit concluded
that "there was no evidence that Carvel intended to deceive or mislead the Brennans" and
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In a "small minority" of states, she might need to prove that she relied on
Paula's statements, 13' although there is authority for the proposition that no
reliance is required "where the seller misstates a disclosure it is legally
required to make.' 32
v. Common Law Misrepresentation
Yet another possibility for Brown is a common law
misrepresentation action. Dan Dobbs summarizes the elements that the
courts have traditionally required:
Courts list anywhere from four to nine elements of
the common law fraudulent misrepresentation claim, but
whatever the number, they agree in substance that the
plaintiff must prove (1) an intentional misrepresentation (2)
of fact or opinion (as distinct from a promise) (3) that is
material and (4) intended to induce and (5) does induce
reasonable reliance by the plaintiff, (6) proximately causing
pecuniary harm to the plaintiff. Procedurally, the plaintiff
may be required to plead fraud with particularity. Many
courts add that fraud must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, although a number say a
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient, at least under
some conditions.' 
33
A successful misrepresentation action may culminate in an award of both
compensatory and punitive damages. 134
Brown will argue generally that the disclosure document she
received misrepresented the expertise of Paula's personnel and the quality
of the assistance she would receive. She will likely be able to prove
materiality because site selection was critical to the success or failure of her
store.135 The disclosure document was clearly designed to induce her to
buy a franchise, and it did induce her to do so. Moreover, she should be
able to prove proximate cause with little difficulty, as her losses stemmed
directly, and not remotely, from Swift's poor performance.
136
upheld the trial court's rejection of their claims under the Massachusetts Little FTC Act.
Id. at 814. For criticism of the court's finding of no intent to deceive, see 2 GARNER,
supra note 6, § 9:21, at 9-82.
SSHELDON & CARTER, supra note 82, § 4.2.4.2.
131 Id. § 4.2.12.3.2.
112 Id. § 4.2.12.3.3. But see Holland, et al., supra note 24, at 33-34 (proof of reliance may
be required under the rubric of causation).
133 2 DOBBS, supra note 24, § 470 (footnotes omitted).
134 Id. § 483.
135 Id. § 476 ("Representations are material if a reasonable person would want to consider
the fact represented in determining whether to enter the transaction in question ... .
136 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (1977) ("A fraudulent
misrepresentation is a legal cause of a pecuniary loss resulting from action or inaction in
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The other elements Dobbs lists may prove more challenging,
however. Consider the requirement that the misrepresentation be
intentional-the requirement of scienter. The basic notion, as applied to
Paula's, is that the company must have made the statements in the
disclosure document without believing that they were true. 137 Brown may
therefore need to prove that the company asserted that its site selection
personnel were experts without believing that to be true. She may have
difficulty meeting that requirement, particularly if the court requires proof
by clear and convincing evidence.' 38 Suppose, for example, that most of
the site selection personnel, including Swift, were recent hires who had
previously worked for a different franchisor. The manager who hired and
supervised them at Paula's may have believed in their expertise, learning
only after Brown's purchase that the decision to hire them was a mistake.
The company will then escape liability even though it was much better
positioned than Brown to discover their ineptitude.
If Brown can show that Paula's could have discovered the
employees' lack of expertise by exercising ordinary care, and if courts in
her jurisdiction allow recovery for negligent misrepresentation, she may be
able to prevail under that doctrine.139 In some states, however, the courts
have not adopted that doctrine.' 40 In states that have, moreover, the
doctrine may apply only if there is a "special relationship" between the
plaintiff and the defendant.14' Fiduciary and other confidential
relationships may well be special for this purpose, as may relationships in
which one party "is retained for the very purpose of providing accurate
information."' 142 Most courts have declined to characterize franchisors as
fiduciaries for their franchisees, 43 and a prospective franchisee is highly
unlikely to qualify as the beneficiary of a fiduciary relation. Moreover,
Brown did not retain Paula's, for the purpose of providing accurate
information or otherwise. The court is likely to regard her relationship with
reliance upon it if, but only if, the loss might reasonably be expected to result from the
reliance.").
137 2 DOBBS, supra note 24, § 471.
138 See id, § 470 (footnotes omitted).
139 Michael Garner adds that "[n]egligent misrepresentation may form the basis of an
action under certain 'little FTC Acts."' 2 GARNER, supra note 6, § 9:14.
140 2 DOBBS, supra note 24, § 472.
141 Id. ("[T]he ordinary commercial adversary bargainer ordinarily has no duty to use care
in supplying information to those with whom he bargains.... Rather, a special
relationship or some implicit undertaking to exercise care in investigating or
communicating information is normally required." (footnotes omitted)).
142 Id. at 1350.
143 2 GARNER, supra note 6, § 8:32 ("Virtually all of the courts that have addressed the
issue have concluded that no fiduciary relationship is implied in a distributorship or a
franchise relationship." (footnotes omitted)). See also, e.g., Cottman Transmission Sys.,
L.L.C. v. Kershner, 536 F.Supp. 2d 543, 556 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
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the company during the negotiation phase as having been at arms length,
rather than as special for purposes of negligent misrepresentation. 44
Another possibility is that the courts in Brown's jurisdiction are
willing to base tort liability on innocent misrepresentations. A tort action
for innocent misrepresentation is a close cousin of a contract action for
breach of warranty.1
45
Section 552C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides as
follows:
(1) One who, in a sale, rental or exchange
transaction with another, makes a misrepresentation of a
material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act or
refrain from acting in reliance upon it, is subject to liability
to the other for pecuniary loss caused to him by his
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though
it is not made fraudulently or negligently.
(2) Damages recoverable under the rule stated in
this section are limited to the difference between the value
of what the other has parted with and the value of what he
has received in the transaction.
146
As the Restatement commentary implicitly acknowledges, not all courts
have endorsed the action.147 Moreover, Fowler Harper, Fleming James, and
Oscar Gray cite various procedural vehicles that plaintiffs have employed in
order to recover for innocent misrepresentations, writing that historically
"[e]ach... vehicle[] had limitations that were arbitrary in some situations,"
and characterizing the whole body of law as "a confusing patchwork."
' 148
Brown's best hope under the heading of innocent misrepresentation
may lie in a claim for rescission and restitution.1 49 "Where this remedy is
'44 2 Garner, supra note 6, § 9:14 ("In general, a simple commercial relationship, such as
that between a buyer and seller or a franchisor and franchisee does not ordinarily
constitute a special relationship that will support a negligent misrepresentation claim.").
145 See 2 DOBBS, supra note 24, § 473 (discussing warranty liability under the heading of
"Innocent Misrepresentation").
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1977).
147 See id., cmt. a (observing that the rule of the section is "reflected in the decisions of a
number of American jurisdictions" and referring to "[t]he courts that apply [the] rule").
148 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 7.7, at 493-94 (3d
ed. 2006) (footnotes omitted). The procedural vehicles are "the equity suit for rescission,
rescission at law, the action for breach of warranty, the action for fraud and deceit, and the
doctrine of estoppel." Id. at 493.
149 See, e.g., Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, (Alaska 1980) (awarding rescission and
restitution to a buyer of real estate on the basis of false representations concerning the real
estate, in the absence of any evidence of negligence or intentional deception by the seller).
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sought courts generally are willing to grant it on the basis of innocent, as
well as culpable, misstatements; while the innocent misrepresenter may not
deserve a penalty, he should not be allowed to benefit by a false statement
at an innocent victim's expense.' ' 50 The authors advocate damages as an
alternative remedy in cases in which the injured party wishes to keep what
he or she has purchased from the misrepresenter. Those damages, however,
will be designed to prevent unjust enrichment of the misrepresenter rather
than to protect the expectation interest of the injured party.' 51
Even as the basis for a rescission claim, moreover, an innocent
misrepresentation action may be unavailable to Brown. If the court
believes that Paula's misrepresentations were neither intentional nor
negligent, it may conclude that tort liability is inappropriate.1
52
Consider next the second element in Dobbs's list of elements of a
common law misrepresentation claim: the plaintiff must prove a
misrepresentation "of fact or opinion (as distinct from a promise)." Brown
will probably be able to prove that element with evidence of Paula's
affirmation of its personnel's expertise, but not with evidence of the
company's promise that prospective franchisees would receive expert site
selection assistance. The conceptual difficulty lies in the orientation of
promises, as opposed to representations. Whereas a representation
concerns a present state of affairs, a promise is a statement of intention to
act or refrain from acting in the future. 153 As such, a promise is untrue only
insofar as it effectively misrepresents the promisor's intention. 54 To
recover on the basis of Paula's promise, Brown would have to show that,
For general discussion of rescission as a remedy in cases of improper disclosure, see
Holland et al., supra note 24, at 40-46.
150 HARPER ET AL., supra note 148, § 7.7, at 494 (footnotes omitted).
"' Id. at 495.
152 Some courts have reasoned essentially that the source of contracting parties' rights and
obligations should be their contract and not the law of innocent misrepresentation:
Some cases, a major Illinois case among them, have taken the view
that the economic loss rule bars tort claims for innocent
misrepresentation, but does not bar claims for intentional or
negligent misrepresentation. A number of other cases, however,
have barred both the claims for innocent and negligent
representations [sic], leaving the plaintiff to recover, if at all, on the
contract or for a tortious injury that was independent of the contract.
2 DOBBS, supra note 24, § 482B (Supp. 2008) (footnotes omitted).
153 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1979).
154 2 DOBBS, supra note 24, § 479 ("[I]f the representation does not qualify as an
enforceable contract, the plaintiff must prove that the statement of intention was false
when it was made and nonperformance is not by itself sufficient for that."). See also, e.g.,
Cook v. Little Caesar Enters., 210 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir. 2000) ("To establish fraud, the
allegedly false statements must relate to past or existing facts, not to future promises or
expectations.").
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when the company gave her the disclosure document, it did not intend to
provide her with expert site selection assistance. Even if that was in fact
the case, Brown may be unable to satisfy her burden of proof on the
issue. 155
The fifth element in Dobbs's list-the need to prove reasonable
reliance on the misrepresentation-may also prove problematic for Brown.
She should be able to prove that she relied on Paula's affirmation regarding
site selection, but she may have a more difficult time convincing the court
that her reliance was reasonable. She will argue that it was reasonable
because Paula's issued the disclosure document pursuant to the FTC Rule.
The affirmation was a formal statement in a legally required document, the
whole purpose of which was to provide reliable information to prospective
franchisees.
Paula's will respond that, in accordance with the FTC Rule, the
cover page of the document contained several statements addressed to
Brown that should have led her to realize that she should not have relied
solely on its contents:
Note... that no governmental agency has verified the
information contained in this document.
15 6
The terms of your contract will govern your franchise
relationship. Don't rely on the disclosure document alone
to understand your contract. Read all of your contract
carefully. Show your contract and this disclosure document
to an advisor, like a lawyer or an accountant.1
57
Buying a franchise is a complex investment. The
information in this disclosure document can help you make
up your mind. More information on franchising.., which
can help you understand how to use this disclosure
document, is available from the [FTC].... Call your state
155 Dobbs suggests some types of evidence that might prove a misrepresentation of
intention to perform:
Direct evidence by way of the defendant's admission by documents
showing that defendant planned not to perform, or circumstantial
evidence that the defendant could not have raised funds necessary for
the construction, or that he had already been denied necessary permits,
or even that he had demonstrated a pattern of making representations
that were never performed would tend to prove that he lacked the
intention he represented.
2 DOBBS, supra note 24, § 479 (footnotes omitted).
156 16 C.F.R. § 436.3(e)(2) (2008).
... Id. at (e)(3).
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agency or visit your public library for other sources of
information on franchising.
15 8
If Brown did an independent investigation of the site's suitability, the court
may believe that she relied on the results of that investigation as much as or
more than the disclosure document. If she did not, the court may believe
that she acted unreasonably, particularly given the warnings on the cover
page of the document and the lack of any provision regarding site selection
in the Franchise Agreement. 159
Brown may respond that neither of the types of advisors the FTC
recommends, nor any expert examining only the disclosure document and
her Franchise Agreement, would have been able to tell whether Paula's site
selection personnel were experts. Yet the court may conclude that she
could have learned the truth, perhaps by consulting with existing
franchisees. Rupert Barkoff writes that in cases of alleged fraud by
franchisors, "the need to prove reliance and the reasonableness of that
reliance are typically the major stumbling blocks for the aggrieved
franchisee."
' 160
In Alabama, Brown could probably use Paula's violation of the
FTC Rule to help prove the elements of misrepresentation. In Rodopoulos
v. Sam Piki Enterprises,161 a franchisee alleged that it had purchased a pizza
franchise on the basis of an inflated earnings claim. In a written projection
and also orally, the franchisor had assured the franchisee that it could
expect gross sales of approximately $12,000 per week, and that all it needed
to break even was $7,000 per week. The franchisor apparently did not
mention the sales of its only two operating stores, which had grossed only
$4,000 to $5,000 per week.1 62 Having bought a franchise and operated it,
the franchisee suffered losses, closed the store, and sued the franchisor for
misrepresentation. At the franchisee's request, the trial court instructed the
jury as to the Rule:
158 Id. at (e)(4).
159 Paula's may also argue that the merger clause in the Franchise Agreement rendered
Brown's reliance on the statements in the disclosure document unreasonable. See, e.g.,
Cottman Transmission Sys., L.L.C. v. Kershner, 536 F. Supp. 2d 543, 551-55 (E.D. Pa.
2008), discussed infra note 208. The court should reject this argument on the basis that
the merger clause is illegal to the extent that it operates to disclaim any of the contents of
the disclosure document. See infra notes 349-55 and accompanying text.
160 Barkoff, supra note 43, at 236 n.15. As Barkoff observes, the court may also require
that fraud be pleaded with a high degree of particularity. In general, he writes, "fraud
lawsuits are not favored by the courts, and generally fraud is difficult to prove." Id. at
236.
161 570 So.2d 661 (Ala. 1990).
162 The court's account of the facts does not state that the franchisor mentioned the sales
of the operating stores. See id. at 663-64.
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Commission. I charge you that you may consider those
regulations in determining what duty, if any, the defendants
owed the plaintiffs to disclose [their] earnings relative to
the operation of [their] business.1 63
The jury returned a verdict for the franchisee.1 64
The duty to disclose was relevant because the franchisor could
argue that although it had made predictions that turned out to be erroneous,
it had not mentioned the sales of its existing stores. Unless it had a duty to
disclose those sales, it had made no misrepresentation. 1
65
The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the instruction. The court
drew an analogy to cases in which juries are permitted to consider
government safety regulations in determining negligence.1 66 Although the
court did not use the phrase "negligence per se," its decision had much the
same effect as decisions applying the negligence per se doctrine. Just as
that doctrine permits plaintiffs to use evidence of a statutory or regulatory
violation as evidence of negligence, the court's decision permitted the
franchisee to use evidence of the FTC Rule as evidence of
misrepresentation. If the court in Brown's case reasons the same way,
67
163 Id. at 665.
164 There was no need to prove scienter; a section of the state's code defines fraud
inclusively as a "misrepresentation[] of a material fact made willfully to deceive, or
recklessly without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake
and innocently and acted on by the opposite party .. " ALA. CODE § 6-5-101
(LexisNexis 2005).
165 See generally 2 DOBBS, supra note 24, § 481.
166 Rodopoulos, 570 So.2d at 665. For discussion of the generally similar concept of
negligence per se, see supra notes 83-109 and accompanying text.
167 At least one other court has done so. In TC Tech Management Co. v. Geeks on Call
America, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-714-RAJ, 2004 WL 5154906 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24,2004), a
federal district court followed Rodopoulos, holding that a franchisee that claimed to have
been defrauded could use its franchisor's alleged violation of the FTC Rule to "help
establish that [the franchisor] violated a duty to disclose information to [the franchisee]."
Id. at *5. The franchisor argued that the court should dismiss the fraud claim because
there is no private action under the Rule. The franchisee responded that it was merely
"using the [Rule] to prove an element of a concealment fraud claim," id, a response that
the court found to be viable under Virginia law, which applied to the dispute. The court
grouped Rodopoulos with cases upholding claims of negligence per se on the basis of
federal regulations:
The Court finds that [the franchisee] can use [the
franchisor's] alleged violation of a federal regulation to help
establish that [the franchisor] violated a duty to disclose information
to [the franchisee]. Several courts have held that FTC regulations
can be used to establish a duty of care for fraud and negligence
claims. For example, in Florida Auto Auction of Orlando, Inc. v.
US., the United States [sic] Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
specifically rejected the defendant's argument that a breach of duty
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the fact finder's consideration of the Rule will probably enhance her
chances for recovery.
b. Tort Law Generally
In general, absent a controlling statute or regulation, the court may
believe that any recovery for Brown should be in contract rather than tort.
Dobbs describes a rule that the court may follow or adopt: "Subject to some
qualifications, the contractual economic loss rule holds that contracting
parties cannot sue one another in tort for pure economic harms on matters
covered by the contract. Instead, they may obtain relief according to the
contract terms and subject to the rules of law applied to contract." 168 The
rule arguably "honors the parties' agreement by limiting liability on
contract matters to those liabilities the contract itself contemplates and
subject to the limitations imposed by law upon contract liabilities. 169
Brown was under no disability when she negotiated for the purchase of her
franchise, and she should arguably have been more vigilant in protecting
her own interests. Her injury was economic rather than personal, and the
court may reason that the company's conduct was not sufficiently
blameworthy to justify tort liability.
2. Contract Law, Excluding Warranty Law
Brown will be able to muster some arguments under the common
law of contract even if she does not invoke warranty law. Contract law is
imposed by federal regulations cannot give rise to [sic] state law
claim of negligence. 74 F.3d 498, 502 n.2 (41h Cir. 1996); see also In
re Sabin Oral Polio Vaccine Prods. Litig., 984 F.2d 124, 127-28 (4t"
Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (affirming the district court's holding that
defendant's violation of federal oral polio vaccine regulations gives
rise to Plaintiff's claims of negligence per se liability under state
law). Also, in Rodopoulos v. Sam Piki Enterprises, Inc., 570 So.2d
661, 665 (Ala. 1990), the Alabama State Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's decision to submit to the jury FTC regulations as
evidence of concealment fraud. In rendering its decision, the court
found that FTC regulations are admissible in this fraud case with
regard to the defendants' duty to disclose." Id. Therefore, following
the precedent and reasoning provided by prior decisions, [the
franchisor's] motion to dismiss for alleged private action under [the
Rule] is DENIED.
Id. See also Holland et al., supra note 24, at 18-19.
168 2 DOBBS, supra note 24, § 482A, at 306-07 (Supp. 2008) (footnote omitted).
169 Id. at 307. See also Holland et al., supra note 24, at 53 ("In the disclosure context, the
Economic Loss Rule should bar a tort claim alleging that the franchisor fraudulently
induced the franchisee by representing that the franchisor would fulfill its obligations
under the agreement.").
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designed to protect expectations, 170 and Paula's created an expectation that
Brown would receive expert site selection assistance. Because she did not,
she is arguably entitled to expectation damages. 171 On the whole, however,
the prospects for a recovery are not bright.
Brown may seek to persuade the court to enforce Paula's
affirmation of site selection expertise as part of a contract. If she does,
however, the company will respond that in general, non-warranty contract
law enforces promises, as opposed to affirmations. 72 The court is unlikely
to try to shoehorn the affirmation into the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts's definition of a promise: "a manifestation of intention to act or
refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made." 173 As a result, contract
enforcement of the affirmation is highly unlikely.
Brown will argue next that the company's promise of expert site
selection assistance is enforceable in contract. Her argument would have
been straightforward and very likely successful if the promise had been set
forth in the Franchise Agreement.' 74 Because the Franchise Agreement said
nothing about site selection, however, she will need to make one of two
arguments. Either the promise was part of a freestanding contract for site
selection assistance, or it was part of the Franchise Contract 175 despite its
absence from the Franchise Agreement.
a. Separate Contract
The argument over whether the parties made a separate contract for
site selection services is relatively straightforward, and Paula's may well
prevail for two reasons. First, the company's promise was part of its
disclosure document, which did not purport to be a contract, and second
Brown arguably gave no consideration for the promise.
The disclosure document consisted largely of descriptive material
regarding Paula's and its existing and former franchisees, as well as various
parameters within which the company and a prospective franchisee might
negotiate a franchise agreement. The document did not consist of a set of
170 See, e.g., JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMAR1 & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 14.4 (5t' ed.
2003) (stating general rule of expectation damages for breach of contract).
171 Id.
172 The affirmation is likely to be actionable in contract only under the rubric of warranty
law, which incorporates affirmations concerning quality in contracts. See infra text at
note 239.
173 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1979).
174 A franchisee was able to enforce a promise of site selection assistance in TCBYSys.,
Inc. v. RSP Co, Inc., 33 F.3d 925 (8"h Cir. 1994). The promise appeared in the parties'
franchise agreement: "[the franchisee] signed a franchise agreement, which stated that [the
franchisor] would provide reasonable assistance in selecting and evaluating proposed
store locations, but [the franchisor's] selection of a proposed location was not a warranty
or representation of the location's suitability." Id. at 927.
175 See supra note 23.
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commitments that the company and Brown had made to each other. The
fact that it incorporated a copy of the company's standard franchise
agreement 176 highlights the contrast between its language of disclosure and
the language of commitment that pervades written contracts. Indeed, many
prospective franchisees who receive copies of disclosure documents decide
not to buy franchises. 1
77
On the issue of consideration, Paula's can observe that Brown gave
the company nothing in exchange for its promise. 178 In some important
respects, the case resembles Brennan v. Carvel Corp.,179 in which the First
Circuit upheld a trial court's finding of a separate contract for site selection
services. Yet Paula's can argue persuasively that Brennan is
distinguishable.
Like Paula's, Carvel advertised expert site
selection personnel and included in its franchise offering
circular' 80 a provision concerning site selection:
Carvel will assume responsibility for selecting, obtaining
and negotiating a suitable location for the Carvel Store.
When a location has been approved, Carvel will negotiate a
176 In this Paper, whereas the term "Franchise Agreement" refers to the document that
Brown and Paula's executed to memorialize the sale of her franchise, and the term
"Franchise Contract" refers to the resulting legal relations between Brown and Paula's,
see supra note 23, the term "franchise agreement" refers to a document executed by any
other franchisee and franchisor to memorialize their purchase and sale of a franchise, and
the term "franchise contract" refers to the resulting legal relations between the other
franchisee and franchisor. See id.
177 But see Arnold, supra note 43, at 212. Arnold writes:
Franchisors often are not eager to provide disclosure documents to
parties before they have expressed a serious interest in the franchise
system. Under the [FTC Rule], a franchisor may be able to carry on
extensive discussions with a prospective franchisee and require a
significant amount of information from the prospective franchisee so
long as the required disclosures are made "at least 14 calendar-days
before the prospective franchisee signs a binding agreement with, or
makes any payment to, the franchisor or an affiliate in connection
with the proposed franchise sale."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a) (2008)).
178 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979) (defining consideration for a
promise as a promise or performance given in exchange for the promise).
179 929 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1991).
180 At the time when the events in Brennan occurred, many franchisors provided
disclosure to prospective franchisees by means of Uniform Franchise Offering Circulars.
See Judith M. Bailey & Dennis E. Wieczorek, Franchise Disclosure Issues, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 93, 101 (Rupert M. Barkoff& Andrew C. Selden, eds.
2004) ("[T]he overwhelming majority of franchisors choose to prepare disclosure
documents pursuant to the UFOC Guidelines .... ").
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rental arrangement, prepare and approve lease documents,
and handle the closing and signing of the lease. A one time
real estate fee of $2,500.00 is paid by the [franchisee]. 181
A Carvel employee who lacked experience in site selection in the state
approved an unsuitable site, and the Brennans bought a franchise for a store
at the site. Like Brown, they sued to recover for losses sustained because of
the site's unsuitability. Unlike Brown, however, they had entered into a
"deposit agreement" with Carvel before executing a franchise agreement,
and they had paid a $1,000 deposit. The deposit agreement provided in
part:
In consideration of the services to be rendered to the
[Brennans] hereunder, the [Brennans] agree[] not to
disclose or to make use of... any trade secrets or
information disclosed to [the Brennans] in reliance upon
this application, including, but not limited to, contemplated
locations for Carvel Stores, methods of financing, sources
of supply, merchandising techniques and operating
methods. It is intended that this clause shall be effective
whether or not a Carvel [franchise agreement] is entered
into between the parties. 1
8 2
At the closing of the sale of the franchise, the parties also executed "several
Carvel sales contracts. ' '183 Pursuant to one of those contracts, the Brennans
paid a $2,500 "real estate services fee."'184 None of the documents
described the real estate services they received.
The First Circuit concluded that the trial court's finding of a
separate contract for site selection assistance was not clearly erroneous:
That the deposit agreement entered into by the Brennans
and Carvel, and Carvel's promise to select, evaluate, and
approve a suitable site for the Brennan's ice cream store
constituted a separate contract, or an agreement collateral
to the franchise agreement, may be shown by an
examination of the deposit agreement. The deposit
agreement expressly stated that Carvel would expend "a
substantial amount of time and effort" in seeking a suitable
181 Brennan, 929 F.2d at 804.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 805.
'84 Id. The opinion does not state that the Brennans paid the fee, but it implies as much by
stating that they "were charged" the fee. Id. at 808. Moreover, the court referred to the
fee in finding that there was consideration for Carvel's promise to provide real estate
services. Id.
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location for the Brennans' ice cream store. The deposit
agreement also required that the Brennans not disclose any
trade secrets or information regarding potential sites
received during this process.
Furthermore, evidence that the Brennans and
Carvel intended to form a separate contract requiring
Carvel to select, evaluate and approve a suitable site or
location for the Brennans' ice cream store may be found
from other materials. For example, Carvel's informational
brochure, which was given to the Brennans at their first
meeting with a Carvel representative and prior to the
formation of the deposit agreement, stated that Carvel
employed "Real Estate location experts," who were
"dedicated to help its owner-operators succeed in their
stores." The disclosure statement specifically stated that
Carvel would "assume responsibility for selecting,
obtaining and negotiating a suitable location for the Carvel
Store." In addition, the sales contract assessed against the
Brennans a $2,500 fee for real estate services, but did not
describe the services provided.
85
The First Circuit's conclusion concerning the deposit agreement was clearly
correct insofar as consideration is concerned. In exchange for its promise
of site selection services, Carvel sought the Brennans' promise to keep
information confidential. Moreover, the Brennans gave their promise in
exchange for Carvel's. 186 The $2,500 fee also supports the court's
conclusion.
In Brown's case, however, there was neither a deposit agreement
nor a sales contract. Unlike the Brennans, moreover, she paid neither a
deposit nor a real estate fee. She may argue that the consideration for
Paula's site selection promise was her continued participation in
negotiations with the company. The court may agree, reasoning that the
parties did not regard the site selection services as a gift from the company
to her. Yet no documents recognized an exchange relationship between the
services and her participation, and she did not promise to continue to
negotiate.
The conclusion that there was no consideration for Paula's site
selection promise would not necessarily mean that there was no separate
contract. If the court viewed Brown's reliance on the promise as
reasonable, she might have a cause of action under section 90 of the
185 Id. at 807-08.
186 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1979).
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts, under which reliance can effectively
substitute for consideration. 1
87
If the court does find a freestanding contract for site selection
services, the company may argue that the parties discharged that contract by
executing the Franchise Agreement, 188 which contained a merger clause.
Brown can respond, however, that even if the Franchise Agreement was a
complete integration of the Franchise Contract, 189 the subject of the
integration was the sale of the franchise, and not site selection. 90 The court
so held in Brennan, permitting the franchisees to introduce evidence of
Carvel's site selection promise despite a merger clause in the parties'
franchise agreement.'91
b. No Separate Contract
If there was no separate site selection contract, Brown will make an
argument in two steps. First, the site selection promise was one of the
terms on which she and Paula's agreed as a term of the franchise sale. And
second, the parties did not discharge that promise by executing the
Franchise Agreement. The second step will require Brown to refute Paula's
arguments concerning the parol evidence rule.
i. Agreement on the Site Selection Promise
The parties could have agreed on the site selection promise in one
of two ways. 192 First, there could have been helpful language in the
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17(2), 90 (1979).
188 See supra text at note 23.
189 See infra text at note 208.
190 See PERILLO, supra note 170, § 3.4(b) ("[T]he existence of a total integration [does] not
prevent 'collateral contracts'-those that are independent of the writing-from being
introduced so long as the main agreement [is] not contradicted." (footnote omitted)).
191 See Brennan v. Carvel Corp., 929 F.2d 801, 806-09 (1991).
192 These methods of incorporation are both based on assent. Brown might argue that
there is a third method, not based on assent, of incorporation of a term that would let her
recover for breach of contract. Consider the following excerpt from Joseph Perillo's
treatise:
It is often stated that existing rules of law are incorporated into
contracts. This is often an elliptical way of stating that the
Constitution protects the validity of contracts under the Contract and
Due Process clauses, or that the common law does not favor
retroactive termination of vested rights by legislative or
administrative action. However, the statement is not so limited.
Mandatory provisions of law governing the kind of contract in
question are read into the contract.
PERILLO, supra note 170, § 3.13 (footnotes omitted). If the FTC Rule is incorporated in
her Franchise Contract, Brown can argue that Paula's violation of the Rule was a breach
of that contract. This argument raises at least three problems, however. First, the alleged
breach occurred before the formation of the Franchise Contract. Absent an express or
implied promise by Paula's that it had not violated the Rule-a warranty-it is unclear
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Franchise Agreement. That language could have incorporated by reference
either the entire disclosure document or at least those provisions relating to
site selection, or it could have constituted or implied a promise by Paula's
to stand behind the contents of the disclosure document. Second, by giving
Brown the disclosure document, Paula's could have promised to include
expert site selection services in the package that Brown would purchase,
and that promise could have become a term of the franchise sale without the
aid of any language in the Franchise Agreement.
(A) Helpful Language in the Franchise
Agreement
In her search for helpful language in the Franchise Agreement, the
best Brown is likely to find is a provision in which Paula's acknowledges
having given her disclosure, such as the following paragraph from a
McDonald's franchise agreement:
Neither McDonald's nor anyone acting on its behalf has
made any representations, inducements, promises, or
agreements, orally or otherwise, respecting the subject
matter of this Franchise, which is not embodied herein or
set forth in the [disclosure document which McDonald's
furnished to the franchisee] .... 193
If the Franchise Agreement contains comparable language, the court will
probably conclude that an acknowledgment of disclosure is by no means
the same as language incorporating the disclosure document or any of its
how the company's earlier action could have constituted a breach. Second, the FTC Rule
arguably governs the process of franchise contract formation, as opposed to the terms of
franchise contracts. Third, the rule that contracts incorporate all existing laws is less than
absolute:
Contrary to petitioners' suggestion, we have not held that all state
regulations are implied terms of every contract entered into while
they are effective, especially when the regulations themselves cannot
fairly be interpreted to require such incorporation. For the most part,
state laws are implied into private contracts regardless of the assent
of the parties only when those laws affect the validity, construction,
and enforcement of contracts.
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 189 (1992). See also, e.g., U.S. v.
Vandenbergen, 969 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1992) (observing that Romein, "among many
other cases, shows that incorporation of public law into private contract is not taken to its
limit"); Robert A. Graham, Note, The Constitution, the Legislature, and Unfair Surprise:
Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause, 92 MICH. L. REv. 398, 428
n. 171 (1993) ("[L]egal rules are only implied terms for the purpose of making the contract
something more than an unenforceable promise").
193 McDonald's Franchise Agreement, attached as Exhibit A to McDonald's Franchise
Offering Circular issued May 1, 2005, at 28(i).
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provisions in the Franchise Agreement.194 Brown's case resembles Rock v.
Voshell, 195 in which a home buyer claimed that she had received a
misleading disclosure statement from her seller. Alleging that she had
bought the home in reliance on the statement, the buyer sued, arguing inter
alia that the statement had been incorporated in the sales agreement. She
pointed to a checkmark in the agreement that appeared next to the following
provision: "Buyer has received a Seller's Property Disclosure Statement
before signing this agreement."' 96 Not surprisingly, the court rejected the
buyer's argument: the checkmark signified her "receipt of that [s]tatement
and nothing more."197
Moreover, Brown cannot argue persuasively that the
acknowledgment constitutes or even implies a promise by Paula's to stand
194 See, e.g., Davis v. McDonald's Corp., 44 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1257 (N.D. Fla. 1998) ("To
incorporate another document by reference, the contract must show an intent to
incorporate that other document and make it part of the contract." (quoting Payne v.
McDonald's, 957 F. Supp. 749, 756 (D. Md. 1997)). But see Gen. Retail Serv., Inc. v.
Wireless Toyz Franchise, L.L.C., 255 F. App'x. 775, 791-92 (5th Cir. 2007). In General
Retail, a franchisee claimed that the franchisor's offering circular contained misleading
statements. The franchisee alleged several causes of action, including misrepresentation
and violation of the applicable Little FTC Act. The federal district court hearing the case
granted summary judgment for the franchisor on the misrepresentation claims, relying at
least in part on a merger clause in the franchise agreement. In the words of the district
court, "statements and representations not incorporated in the Franchise Agreement are
nothing more than 'puffing' or sales talk .. " Id. at 791-92. The Fifth Circuit quoted a
paragraph from the parties' franchise agreement:
Except as provided in the Offering Circular delivered to the
[franchisee], the [franchisee] acknowledges that Wireless Toyz has
not, either orally or in writing, represented estimated or projected
any specified level of sales, cost or profits for this Franchise, nor
represented the sales, cost or profit level of any other Wireless Toyz
Store.
Id. at 791. The franchise agreement also provided that the franchisee warranted that,
"based on the information disclosed in the Offering Circular ... [the franchisee] was
financially able to accept the risks associated with [the franchise]." Id Concluding that
the district court had erred in various respects, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.
On remand, the Fifth Circuit wrote, "[i]n light of [the merger clause and the quoted
paragraph, the district court] should consider whether statements in the Offering Circular
are incorporated into the Franchise Agreement." Id. at 792. On remand, the franchisee
could argue that, by including its warranty in the franchise agreement, the franchisor had
implicitly vouched for the accuracy of the information in the Offering Circular that
formed the basis of that warranty. For a case in which a contract for the sale of real estate
incorporated by reference written warranties set forth in other documents, see Flom v.
Stahly, 569 N.W.2d 135, 138, 140 (Iowa 1997).
"' 397 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
196 Id. at 620.
'
97 Id. at 623.
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behind the contents of the disclosure document.' 98 Consider the following
provision from the McDonald's franchise agreement quoted above:
The parties agree that the happening of any of the
following events shall constitute a material breach of this
Franchise and violate the essence of Franchisee's
obligations and, without prejudice to aiy of its other rights
or remedies at law or in equity, McDonald's, at its election,
may terminate this Franchise upon the happening of any of
the following events:
(n) Franchisee makes any misrepresentations to
McDonald's relating to the acquisition and/or ownership of
this Franchise;
199
The clear implication of that language is that the franchisee not made any
misrepresentations to McDonald's. There is no comparable provision in the
agreement concerning any misrepresentations by McDonald's to the
franchisee.
If Brown's Franchise Agreement provides that she has not made
any misrepresentations in acquiring her franchise, but contains no
comparable provision relating to misrepresentations by Paula's, the court
will probably reason that she and the company knew how to draft language
providing that a misrepresentation constituted a breach of contract and
chose to do so only with respect to a misrepresentation by her. Even absent
such a material breach provision, moreover, a plain-meaning interpretation
of the acknowledgment language will not lead to the conclusion that it
amounts to a promise by Paula's to stand behind any of the contents of the
document.2 °°
(B) No Helpful Language in the Franchise
Agreement
Lacking helpful language in the Franchise Agreement, Brown will
argue that the court's starting point should be Joseph Perillo's observation
that, in determining the terms of a contract, "[a]ll of the writings that form a
198 For an example of language from a franchise agreement that arguably implies a
promise by the franchisor to stand behind some of the information in a disclosure
document, see Gen. Retail Serv., Inc. v. Wireless Toyz Franchise, L.L. C., 255 F. App'x.
775, 791 (5th Cir. 2007). For a brief summary of the case, see supra note 194.
199 McDonald's Franchise Agreement, attached as Exhibit A to McDonald's Franchise
Offering Circular issued May 1, 2005, at 18, 18(n).
200 See, e.g., Davis v. McDonald's Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
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part of the same transaction should be interpreted together and, if possible,
harmonized.",20 The disclosure document and the Franchise Agreement
were both part of one transaction: her purchase of the franchise. The court
can harmonize the two documents because there is no inconsistency
between them; nothing in the Franchise Agreement,202 except perhaps the
merger clause, contradicts the promise of expert site selection that appeared
in the disclosure document. The court should therefore find that the parties
included the promise as a term of the franchise sale.
Paula's will respond, however, that the disclosure document does
not purport to be and is not a manifestation of the parties' assent.2 °3
Moreover, by the time Brown and Paula's executed the Franchise
Agreement, site selection had already taken place. Even apart from any
discharge of the site selection promise under the parol evidence rule, then, a
court might very well find that the parties did not intend to include the
promise as a term of the franchise sale.
On the whole, the resolution of this issue is likely to depend on the
court's overall approach to issues of contract formation and interpretation.
A court that tends to focus on documents to the exclusion of other evidence,
and to interpret those documents literally, may conclude that the promise
was not a term of the franchise sale. A court that is less inclined to focus on
documents alone and to interpret them literally may conclude that, at least
initially, the promise in the disclosure document was a term of the franchise
sale.2°4
ii. Parol Evidence
If the court concludes that the parties initially agreed on the
company's promise concerning site selection assistance, the analysis will
move to the parol evidence rule. Analysis under that rule is necessary
because the parties might have discharged the promise by executing the
Franchise Agreement. If so, the promise was no longer binding on Paula's
in the wake of Brown's purchase of her franchise; it was not part of the
Franchise Contract.
201 PERILLO, supra note 170, § 3.13. Perillo rejects the standard distinction between
"offering evidence of a consistent additional term and offering evidence on the issue of
meaning." Id. § 3.16. As a result, he would presumably not limit the reach of the
generalization in the text to questions of interpretation of the words of a written contract.
Allan Farnsworth, by contrast, includes a generalization similar to Perillo's in a
subchapter on interpretation of contractual language, while another subchapter discusses
determination of "the subject matter to be interpreted." See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS, ch. 7 (4th ed. 2004). Farnsworth's generalization appears in subchapter 7(C),
on interpretation. See id. § 7.10, at 453. Subchapter (B) discusses the determination of
the subject matter to be interpreted. Id. subch. (B).
202 Recall that the Franchise Agreement said nothing about site selection or site selection
assistance. See supra text at note 23.
203 See supra text at notes 176-77.
204 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, The "New Conservatism" in Contract Law and the
Process of Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REv. 879 (1999).
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The issue under the parol evidence rule will be whether the
Franchise Agreement was a complete integration of the parties' agreement
for the franchise sale. 0 5 The court will very likely believe that the
Franchise Agreement is at least a partial integration of that agreement. It is
a formal document which the parties signed at the conclusion of their
negotiations, and it certainly appeared final at least with respect to the terms
that it contained.20 6
If the Franchise Agreement is only a partial integration, Brown's
evidence of Paula's site selection promise will probably be admissible. The
evidence does not contradict any language in the Franchise Agreement,
207
which says nothing about either site selection or site selection assistance.
In that case, Brown may well prevail.
If the Franchise Agreement is a complete integration, however,
then by signing it Brown and Paula's discharged all their earlier promises,
including the site selection promise. Unless Brown is able to use the FTC
Rule to defeat the parol evidence rule, her evidence of the promise will be
inadmissible and she will lose.20 8
205 Recall that the Franchise Agreement is the document Brown and Paula's executed to
memorialize their agreement regarding the sale of the franchise and the Franchise
Contract is the resulting set of legal relations. See supra note 23.
206 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 201, § 7.3, at 418-19 ("If [parties to a written contract]
intended the writing to be a final expression of the terms it contains, but not a complete
expression of all the terms agreed upon - some terms remaining unwritten - the
agreement is partially integrated.").
207 See id. at 420 ("If an agreement is only partially integrated, it must then be determined
whether the evidence of prior negotiations sought to be introduced would be 'consistent'
with the writing and would therefore merely 'supplement' it, or whether it would
'contradict' a term of the writing. In the former case it is admissible but in the latter it is
not." (footnotes omitted)).
208 For discussion of the FTC Rule's provisions concerning parol evidence, see infra notes
348-64 and accompanying text. In Cottman Transmission Systems, L.L.C. v. Kershner,
536 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Pa. 2008), franchisees alleged various causes of action against
their franchisor, including common law fraud in the inducement and negligent
misrepresentation. They alleged that the franchisor's offering circular (UFOC) had
contained misleading information which led them to invest in the franchise system:
For example, the Franchisees allege that [the franchisor]
misrepresented the average profit made by franchise store owners,
the number of... franchise stores that had closed in the past, the
experience necessary to operate a franchise, and the average sales of
franchise stores. The allegation is not that [the franchisor] made
fraudulent promises or projections of the earnings of future
franchisees, but that [the franchisor] inaccurately reported the data
for past time periods, distorting the facts upon which the Franchisees
based their decisions of whether to purchase ... franchise stores.
Id. at 552. The franchisees had signed franchise agreements that contained merger
clauses, and those clauses stated that the franchisees were not relying on any
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As James Thayer famously observed, few subjects are harder to
understand than the parol evidence rule. 20 9 There is clearly more than one
judicial methodology 210 for determining the extent of an integration, and
leading commentators have adopted different classifications of the existing
methodologies.21 Allan Farnsworth also reports that "[s]urprisingly little
light is shed on the problem by the hundreds of decisions resolving the
issue of whether an agreement is completely integrated.,
21 2
representations not incorporated in the franchise agreements. Applying Pennsylvania law,
the court dismissed the claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Id. at 554. "The
parol evidence rule," the court wrote, "prevents the Franchisees from relying on extrinsic
evidence, including the UFOC, to establish their claims of fraud in the inducement or
negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 552.
Some state courts maintain an exception to the parol evidence rule for evidence
offered to establish fraud in the inducement of a contract. See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note
170, § 3.7(c) ("The general rule is that a proof of fraud in the inducement may be shown
to avoid the written agreement even in the face of a merger clause and even if the
evidence offered specifically contradicts the writing or a merger clause." (footnotes
omitted)). The rationale for these holdings is that, in Perillo's concise phrase "[fraud
corrupts everything it touches." Id. A merger clause in a contract induced by fraud
should therefore be ineffective.
If a court holds, as did the Cottman court, that the parol evidence rule excludes
evidence of the contents of a disclosure document when those contents are offered to
establish misrepresentation, then a fortiori that court should exclude evidence of those
contents when offered to establish terms of a contract in the absence of proof of
misrepresentation.
See also Medicine Shoppe Int'l v. Stopa, No. 4:07-CV-642, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62427, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 11, 2008) ("To the extent that the parties believe
that the UFOC and Operations Manual are part of the License Agreement, that position
would appear to be foreclosed by the agreement's merger or integration provision.").
209 "Few things in our law are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties." James B.
Thayer, The "Parol Evidence Rule," 6 HARV. L. REv. 325, 325 (1893). Writing before
the advent of either the Code or its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act, Thayer referred to
the common law parol evidence rule.
21o The issue of whether the parol evidence rule excludes evidence is one for the court.
Perillo explains:
The parol evidence rule is generally stated in terms of the intent of
the parties. Did the parties intend an integration and did they intend
it to be total? Questions of intent are ordinarily questions of fact and
would normally be submitted to a jury. However, the courts have
transmuted this question of intent, whether actual or presumed, by
legal alchemy into a question of law to be decided in the first
instance by the trial judge and subject to appellate review.
PERILLO, supra note 170, § 3.2(c) (footnotes omitted).
211 Compare PERILLO, supra note 170, § 3.4 (listing six methodologies in American law)
with JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 84(C) (4th ed. 2001) (also
listing six methodologies in American law, but characterizing four of the six differently).212 FARNSWORTH, supra note 201, § 7.3, at 423 (footnote omitted).
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In general, however, the relatively restrictive methodology of
Samuel Williston and the more liberal methodology of Arthur Corbin have
been highly influential.213 Brown's evidence of Paula's promise is less
likely to be admissible under Williston's methodology than under Corbin's.
(A) Williston
According to Williston, a court should determine whether a
214document is a total or only a partial integration by asking three questions.
Depending on the answer(s), the court may need to ask only the first, only
the first two, or all three.
The first question is whether the document at issue-in this case
the Franchise Agreement-contains a merger clause. If so, the document is
a complete integration and there is no need to ask either the second or the
third question.2 5 Paula's will point out that the Franchise Agreement does
contain a merger clause, which will render it a complete integration and
exclude Brown's evidence. Because the Franchise Agreement says nothing
about site selection or site selection assistance, Brown will have no cause of
action for breach of contract.
If for some reason the court invalidates the merger clause, 1 6 the
next question in Williston's analysis will be whether the Franchise
Agreement appears complete.1 7 Because one or more professional advisors
probably drafted the document for Paula's, the answer is very likely yes.
The analysis will therefore proceed to the third question.
218
Williston's third question is whether Paula's promise concerning
site selection assistance is one that the parties, in drafting the Franchise
Agreement, would naturally have omitted. If they would naturally have
omitted it from the document even though they regarded it as a term of the
franchise sale, then the document is only a partial integration and the
evidence is admissible. If they would not naturally have omitted the
promise, the Franchise Agreement is a complete integration and the
evidence is inadmissible.2 19
The "natural omission" test is objective. The issue is not what
Brown and Paula's actually believed concerning the terms of the franchise
213 See id. at 422-23 (contrasting Williston's methodology with Corbin's); PERILLO, supra
note 170, § 3.4 (same).
214 This discussion of Williston's methodology is based on Perillo's summary of that
methodology. See PERILLO, supra note 170, § 3.4(c).
215 See id. The Franchise Agreement is probably not obviously incomplete and the merger
clause was not "included as a result of fraud or mistake or any other reason sufficient to
set aside a contract .... " Id.
216 See infra notes 349-60 and accompanying text.
217 PERILLO, supra note 170, § 3.4(c).
218 If the Franchise Agreement had been obviously incomplete, it would have been at most
a partial integration and Brown's evidence would probably have been admissible; the
evidence is consistent with the document, which says nothing about site selection. See id.
219 id.
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sale. Williston asks, rather, whether reasonable parties in the same
circumstances would have omitted the promise from their franchise
agreement even though they considered it part of the sale.22°
The court's answer to the natural inclusion question is not easy to
predict. Brown will of course argue that a reasonable franchisor and
prospective franchisee could omit a site selection promise from their
franchise agreement even though they considered it a term of the franchise
sale. The omission would simply be the result of timing; the parties would
assume when they signed the franchise agreement that the franchisor had
already fulfilled its site selection promise. The prospective franchisee
would certainly not have intended to release the franchisor from its
promise, thereby losing any recourse if the site proved unsuitable. And
without agreement by both parties, there could be no discharge.
Paula's will counter that a reasonable franchisor and prospective
franchisee would not have signed a franchise agreement while believing
that the promise was part of their franchise contract. In light of the
importance to the prospective franchisee of proper site selection, his or her
inexperience in selecting sites, and the fact that he or she was buying a
franchise in a new location rather than taking over a going concern, he or
she would have refused to sign the document unless the franchisor agreed to
amend it to include the promise.
Given those opposing arguments and the degree of play in the parol
evidence rule, 22' either Brown or Paula's may prevail on the integration issue.
The result will probably depend on the court's approach to contract law in
general and parol evidence questions in particular, its sense of the equities of
Brown's case, and the case law of her jurisdiction.222
(B) Corbin
For Corbin, there is essentially only one question: did Brown and
Paula's intend, by executing the Franchise Agreement, to discharge the site
selection promise. The court must examine all the circumstances, as opposed
to only the Franchise Agreement. The merger clause alone is not to have
conclusive effect.223 Although this question may seem to invite the same
arguments as Williston's question regarding natural inclusion, the two
questions are not the same. Corbin focuses on the actual intent of the two
parties, as opposed to the presumed intent of a reasonable person. If Brown
and Paula's, or either of them, signed the Franchise Agreement without
intending to discharge the company's site selection promise, then there was no
220id.
221See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 170, § 3.2(b) (describing the parol evidence rule as
"riddled through with exceptions and applications difficult to reconcile .... ).222For contrasting applications of the natural omission test, see Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E.
646 (N.Y. 1928) (majority and dissenting opinions).223See 3 CORBiN, supra note 23, §§ 581, 582 (1960). See also PERILLO, supra note 170, §
3.4(d).
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discharge. Only if both intended a discharge will Brown's evidence be
inadmissible.224 Although the court may believe that Paula's intended a
discharge, it is unlikely to conclude that Brown did, so the result will likely be
that the evidence is admissible.
C. Summary
The false affirmation and unperformed promise in Paula's
disclosure document misled Brown. In reliance on the document, she
bought a franchise in a location that was unsuitable, and she suffered
serious losses as a result. If she sues in tort or in contract without claiming
breach of warranty, she may or may not recover from the company. She is
unlikely to be able to enforce its promise in tort. With respect to the false
affirmation, a private action under the FTC Rule is probably out of the
question. Moreover, her success will not be assured if she alleges one or
more of the other four torts. Much will depend on her jurisdiction and the
resolution of certain factual issues. She may, for example, fail in a common
law fraud action if she is unable to prove that Paula's deceived her
intentionally or negligently.
Although non-warranty contract law offers Brown some hope, the
obstacles on that path are daunting. She has little hope of enforcing Paula's
affirmation, and must focus instead on the company's site selection
promise. Proving a freestanding contract for expert site selection assistance
will be difficult. And enforcing the promise as part of the Franchise
Contract will require her to prove both that the parties initially agreed on
the promise as a term of the franchise sale and also that they did not
discharge it by executing the Franchise Agreement. 225 She is not without
arguments concerning the promise, but she would be unwise to assume that
she will prevail.
III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: THE CODE, THE COMMON LAW, AND THE
FTC RULE
If she can persuade the court to treat the contents of the disclosure
document as express warranties, Brown will overcome at least some of the
obstacles she faces in tort and in non-warranty contract law. Both
2243 CORBIN, supra note 23, §§ 581, 582.
225 Paula's might also argue that, by executing the Franchise Agreement and beginning
to operate the franchise, Brown waived any right she might have had to deny that the
company had provided expert site selection services. A third possible argument for
the company is that, having permitted it to rely on her apparent satisfaction with the
services, she is estopped to claim that they were inadequate. Her response to either of
those arguments should be that, until she tried and failed to make a profit in the
operation of the franchise, she had no way of knowing that Swift was not an expert or
that the site was inappropriate.
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affirmations and promises can constitute warranties. Paula's affirmation,
not otherwise enforceable in contract, will give rise to a promise to stand
behind its truth. In addition, warranty law effectively draws certain
affirmations and promises into a contract of sale even if non-warranty
contract rules do not do so. As a result, Paula's affirmation and promise
can be enforceable as express warranties even though they are not part of a
freestanding contract for site selection assistance and even though they are
neither included nor incorporated by reference in the Franchise Agreement.
Moreover, warranty liability is strict liability. Brown will not need to prove
that the company acted either intentionally or negligently in failing to
provide expert site selection assistance.
If the affirmation and promise were warranties, Swift's inept
performance was a breach of the Franchise Contract. Paula's will be liable
to Brown for breach of contract and she will be entitled to expectation
damages.
226
Brown bought a business format franchise, and even if the
Franchise Contract gave her the right to buy ingredients for soft ice cream
from Paula's, the court will probably conclude that the common law
governs her warranty claim.2 2 7 Although courts have enforced express
warranties in a variety of common law cases, however, few if any of those
cases have involved sales of franchises. Brown must therefore persuade the
court to extend the common law of express warranties into the arena of
franchise sales.
Section 2-313 of the Code can play an important role in bringing
about that extension. During the 1900s and earlier, legislatures and courts
first developed warranty law to govern sales of goods and then extended
various aspects of that law to other kinds of transactions. 228 The warranty
226 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (normal
remedy for breach of contract is expectation damages); U.C.C. § 2-714(2), (3)
(measure of damages for breach of warranty is value of goods if they had been as
warranted less their value as accepted plus, "[i]n a proper case," incidental and
consequential damages). Brown will probably ask for compensation for the profits she
would have made had she received expert assistance in selecting a site. The court will
likely conclude that the profits are speculative because the business was new. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981) ("Damages are not recoverable
for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable
certainty."). The more likely measure of damages is the difference between the value
the franchise would have had if the site selection assistance had been as promised and
its actual value. The actual value was arguably zero because Brown was unable to
make a profit. Of course, if Brown also holds the company liable in tort, the court will
decline to award what it regards as a double recovery. For discussion of remedies for
misrepresentation, see DOBBS supra note 24, § 483.
227 See supra notes 6-1 1 and accompanying text.
228 See, e.g., I BARKELY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT
WARRANTIES § 2:27 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the implied warranty of habitability in
the sale of new homes as "an analogical extension of the [Code] implied warranty of
merchantability .... ); Daniel E. Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2
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sections in the Code and its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act,2z9
functioned as blueprints; courts analogized other transactions to sales of
goods for purposes of determining the seller's obligations concerning
quality.23° Brown's argument will be that the court should continue that
process in her case.
To the extent that courts have already developed express warranty
law for sales other than sales of goods, of course, the cases involving those
sales will support Brown's argument. In a jurisdiction with a well-
developed common law of express warranties, the step she asks the court to
take will appear relatively small and the role of section 2-313 may be
relatively minor. In a jurisdiction in which there is little common law
precedent for enforcement of express warranties, her argument will appear
more radical and the role of the section will be more important.
Under the Code,2 3 1 as well as the common law,2 32 the parol
evidence rule can exclude evidence of affirmations and promises that would
otherwise be enforceable as express warranties. As a result, Brown will
invoke the new provision in the FTC Rule that is designed to prevent
franchisors from using merger clauses to defeat claims based on statements
in franchise disclosure documents. The new provision will probably permit
her to introduce the evidence she needs to prove Paula's warranties.
Brown's argument will thus stand on three legs: the Code, the
common law of express warranties, and the new FTC Rule provision.
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 447, 456 (1971) (Courts that
have found implied warranties in sales of new homes by builder-vendors "have
justified these warranties by analogy to the implied warranties present in the sale of
goods and have relied upon a series of law review articles advocating this growth
from the sale of goods analogy." (footnote omitted)).
229 UNIFORM SALES ACT (1906) (withdrawn 1951).
230 See, e.g., 3 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-314:74 (1995). Anderson reports:
The fact that a given transaction is a non-Code transaction is
not controlling in determining whether the Code should be applied.
Courts following a. . . liberal approach to the interpretation of the
Code look upon the Code's implied warranty provisions not only as
provisions governing sales, but also as a statement of public policy
embodying the foremost legal thought in commercial transactions.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Debra L. Goetz et al., Special Project, Article 2
Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1159,
1168-70 ("Courts use [an analogy] approach to extend Code warranties to nonsale
transactions in goods." (footnote omitted)).
"' See U.C.C. §§ 2-202, 2-316(1) (2002); 1 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 228, § 4:24,
at 4-96 ("[O]ne of the most important applications of the parol evidence rule is to
exclude oral (or prior written) express warranties.").
232 Id. § 2:31 (In a sale of real estate, if an express "warranty is oral, the statute of
frauds or the parol evidence rule could be raised as a barrier.").
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Subpart A of this Part focuses on the Code, Subpart B on the common law,
and Subpart C on the Rule.
Subpart A begins by demonstrating that, if section 2-313 applied to
Brown's case, Paula's affirmation and promise would constitute express
warranties, included in the Franchise Contract.233 The Subpart then turns to
policy considerations. The official commentary to section 2-313 reveals the
principal policies on which it is based, and those policies militate in
Brown's favor. Moreover, there is considerable support in Code literature,
official commentary to Article 1, and case law for application of section 2-
313 policies in particular and Code policies in general in non-Code cases.
The Subpart concludes that the court should apply section 2-313 by analogy
in Brown's case because its underlying policies are as apposite to sales of
franchises as to sales of goods.
Subpart B samples the common law of express warranties in three
kinds of sales that Brown can argue are analogous to hers: sales of real
estate, services, and businesses. The sample suggests that there may be
some useful cases in her jurisdiction and provides some insight into the
influence of the Code and the Uniform Sales Act on the common law
development. The sample also reveals the role of some other statutory
provisions which may or may not be helpful to Brown, depending on the
court's view of the implications of the legislature's action. The Subpart
concludes that, although the impact of the statutes is uncertain, the common
law cases may offer Brown helpful analogies.
Subpart C assesses the implications of the new FTC Rule provision
regarding merger clauses for Brown's case. Under that provision, the
merger clause in the Franchise Agreement is almost certainly
unenforceable. In theory, a court following Williston's approach to the
parol evidence rule could nevertheless find the Franchise Agreement to be a
complete integration of the Franchise Contract. That outcome is unlikely,
however, given the obvious purpose of the new provision. The more likely
result is that Brown will prevail in the argument over parol evidence.
A. The Code
1. Application of Section 2-313 in Brown s Case
If section 2-313 applied to Brown's case, she would be able to base
her claim of breach of express warranty on either Paula's affirmation or its
promise, or both. The section provides as follows:
233 The assumption, of course, is that the parol evidence rule would not exclude
evidence of either the affirmation or the promise. For discussion of the new FTC
Rule provision that justifies that assumption, see infra notes 349-60 and
accompanying text.
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§ 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise,
Description, Sample.
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of
the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty
that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or
''guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty.2 34
Substituting "franchise" for "goods" leads to several conclusions in
Brown's case. Consider first what the section does not say. It makes no
reference to either scienter or negligence, so she need not prove either of
those states of mind. Moreover, no language requires that express
warranties be part of a freestanding contract or included or incorporated by
reference in a written contract of sale. As a result, Brown need not prove
compliance with either of those formalities. The official commentary
2 35
confirms that inference. Comment 3 provides in part:
234 U.C.C. § 2-313 (2002).
235 White and Summers describe the Code comments as "by far the most useful aids
to interpretation and construction." Judges "take to the comments like ducks to
water, even though the legislatures did not enact the comments." WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 5. The authors offer some caveats, however. Id.
Moreover, other scholars have argued that the comments are not entitled to the same
degree of deference as are the reporter's notes and illustrations in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. See Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting on
"Purpose" in the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 419 (1997).
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In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller
about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the
description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on
such statements need be shown in order to weave them into
the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to
take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement
requires clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one
of fact.
23 6
Comment 7 adds: "The precise time when words of description or
affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material. The sole
question is whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be
regarded as part of the contract.,' 237 Section 2-313 thus removes one of the
major obstacles that confronted Brown under non-warranty contract law. 238
Consider next what the section does say. Under subsection (1)(a),
both Paula's affirmation of fact and its promise created express warranties
236 U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (2002). Paula's can argue that the statements in the
disclosure document were not made "during a bargain" but rather before the parties
had begun to bargain. As a result, the statements should be included in the Franchise
Contract only if Brown relied on them. Brown's response will be twofold. First, she
received the document when she met with the sales manager for Paula's, and it was at
that meeting that the parties' bargaining began. Second, even if the bargaining began
after that meeting, she did rely on the statements so the court should treat them as
part of the Franchise Contract.
237 U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (2002). See also, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-714 cmt. 2 (2002) ("The
'non-conformity' referred to in subsection (1) includes not only breaches of
warranties but also any failure of the seller to perform according to his obligations
under the contract.").238 William Hawkland and Frederick Miller explain:
The express warranty is merely a term of the contract
having to do with the quality, description, or title of the goods, and it
is not different in kind from other express terms such as price,
delivery, or quantity. Much of the difficulty experienced by lawyers
and courts with express warranties rests on an incomplete
understanding of this basic proposition.
The fact that an express warranty is simply a term of the
contract does not, of course, mean that it must be separately
bargained for, or even included in the written agreement. In the
absence of limitations based upon the parol evidence rule, it is
enough that the parties have actually agreed on the quality,
description, or title of the goods.
William D. Hawkland & Frederick H. Miller, Article 2: Sales § 2-313:2, in
HAWKLAND, U.C.C. SERIES (2002) (footnotes omitted).
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if they related to the franchise 239 and became "part of the basis of the
bargain." Moreover, the affirmation may have been part of the description
of the franchise under subsection (1)(b), creating an express warranty under
that subsection if it was part of the basis of the bargain.
Despite a large volume of scholarly commentary,240 the courts have
not reached a consensus concerning the meaning of the "basis of the
bargain" requirement. Some courts have concluded that it requires the
buyer to prove that he or she relied on the seller's statement(s), whereas
other courts have found express warranties without proof of reliance.241
Paula's can argue with some force that the court should require
proof of reliance in Brown's case. Reliance is necessary, the company will
argue, to draw the affirmation and promise into the Franchise Contract.
James White explains the logic that underlies this contention.2 42 White
notes that the historical roots of warranty law lie in tort as well as in
243
contract. Various writers have argued that the warranty cause of action
grew out of the tort action for deceit, which required proof of reliance.2 "
239 Paula's might argue that the affirmation and promise related not to the franchise
but rather to the site selection process. Brown can respond, however, that the site
was for the franchise, and a suitable site is crucial to the success of a "bricks-and-
mortar" store. The contents of the disclosure document all focused on Paula's
franchises, and the language regarding site selection had no meaning except as
applied to a franchise. The court will likely agree with Brown and find that the
affirmation and promise did relate to the franchise for purposes of section 2-313.
240 See, e.g., WHITE& SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 9-5, at 356 (courts should require
proof of reliance); Charles A. Heckman, "Reliance" or "Common Honesty of
Speech ": The History and Interpretation of Section 2-313 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1987) (courts should not require
proof of reliance); Sidney Kwestel, Freedom From Reliance: A Contract Approach
to Express Warranty, 26 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 959 (1992) (same).
241 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 9-5 n.2.
242 See James J. White, Freeing the Tortious Soul of Express Warranty Law, 72 TUL.
L. REV. 2089, 2109-10 (1998).
243 See id at 2090-94.
244 See id. at 2091 ("'As has been seen, the action upon a warranty was in its origin a
pure action of tort."' (quoting SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF
GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT 251 (1909) (footnote
omitted))). See also, e.g., 1 ORA FRED HARRIS, JR. & ALPHONSE M. SQUILLANTE,
WARRANTY LAW IN TORT AND CONTRACT ACTIONS § 1.1 (1989). Harris and
Squillante write:
When one considers that the action for breach of warranty was one
that originally was grounded in the tort of deceit but is now
considered to be within the province of contract law, one can see that
the statement "the seller's warranty is a curious hybrid, born of the
illicit intercourse of tort and contract" is an accurate description both
of the past and of the future development of the concept of warranty
law.
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Even today, White suggests, the basis of express warranty liability for false
representations or broken promises that are not "part of the contract under
conventional definitions of contract" is tort.245 Just as reliance is necessary
to establish liability for misrepresentation in tort, it should be necessary to
draw pre-contractual affirmations and promises into the sales agreement,
thereby giving the buyer a contract cause of action for their breach.246
Paula's will cite the chief obstacle that Brown encountered in non-
warranty contract law: the statements in the disclosure document were not,
in White's phrase, part of the Franchise Contract "under conventional
definitions of contract." As a result, the court should grant warranty status
to the statements only if Brown proves she relied on them.
In a jurisdiction in which the courts agree with the company's
argument, Brown's ability to satisfy the basis of the bargain requirement
will depend on her success in proving her reliance. In a jurisdiction in
which the courts do not require reliance, however, Brown may recover for
breach of warranty even if she could not have recovered for common law
misrepresentation.
247
If the court does require proof of reliance and Brown shows that
she did rely on the statements, Paula's may argue that, given the merger
clause in the Franchise Agreement, her reliance was unreasonable. The
court should reject that argument on the basis of the new FTC Rule
241provision.
Brown should have little, if any, difficulty in persuading the court
that Paula's affirmation and promise were more than mere puffing under
section 2-313(2). Although "expertise" is arguably a matter of degree, the
affirmation and promise appeared in a legally required disclosure document
on which prospective franchisees were supposed to be able to rely.
2. Policy
a. Express Warranties
A comment summarizes the principal policy that underlies section
2-313:
In view of the principle that the whole purpose of
the law of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller
has in essence agreed to sell, the policy is adopted of those
cases which refuse except in unusual circumstances to
recognize a material deletion of the seller's obligation.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Timothy J. Sullivan, Innovation in the Law of
Warranty: The Burden of Reform, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 341, 351 (1980) ("Suits for
breach of warranty were first brought in tort as actions on the case for deceit."
(footnote omitted)).
245 White, supra note 242, at 2109-10.246 Id.
247 See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
248 See infra notes 349-60 and accompanying text.
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Thus, a contract is normally a contract for a sale of
something describable and described....
This is not intended to mean that the parties, if they
consciously desire, cannot make their own bargain as they
wish. But in determining what they have agreed upon good
faith is a factor and consideration should be given to the
fact that the probability is small that a real price is intended
to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation.249
In the words of Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter of Article 2, "'[w]hat
we need in business is common honesty of speech,' telling the truth about
commodities and standing ready to make good one's assertions., 250 Section
2-313(2) of course reflects the distinction between serious assurances,
which merit enforcement, and mere sales talk, which does not.
The policy favoring common honesty of speech is at least as
apposite-indeed as important-in the arena of franchise sales as in the
arena of sales of goods. It is especially apposite, moreover, as applied to
statements included in a legally mandated disclosure document. The FTC
promulgated its Rule in response to considerable evidence of abusive sales
tactics in franchising. 251 Many prospective franchisees are no doubt
capable of protecting their own interests in negotiating with franchisors
who eschew deceptive tactics. Yet the law should not expect even those
prospective franchisees to question the veracity of the contents of a
franchise disclosure document.
Common honesty of speech requires that the court hold Paula's to
the contents of the disclosure document. The company chose to include the
site selection affirmation and promise in the disclosure document it
prepared, presumably to increase the attractiveness of its franchise
offerings. Brown relied on the document, and her losses resulted from its
misleading character. Even if Paula's acted neither intentionally nor
negligently, it should bear the risk of inaccuracies in the document.
Paula's may argue that Brown would have discovered Swift's
ineptitude if she had consulted existing or former Paula's franchisees. She
might have discovered the unsuitability of the site if she had investigated
249 U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 4 (2002).
250 UNIF. REVISED SALES ACT § 37 cmt. at 146 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944)
(quoting Foote v. Wilson, 178 P. 430, 430 (1919)).
251 See 2007 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 32, at 15,445 ("The [FTC]
promulgated the original franchise rule on December 21, 1978. Based upon the
original rulemaking record, the [Agency] found widespread deception in the sale of
franchises and business opportunities through both material misrepresentations and
nondisclosure of material facts." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 15,447-49 (explaining
the continuing need for the Rule).
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the site's suitability herself, engaging any professional help she needed in
the process. As a result, she is at least partly responsible for her losses.
Brown may not have had sufficient financial resources to obtain
expert legal or business advice before making her purchase, however. And
even if she had those resources and thus shares in the blame for her losses,
the court can temper her remedy to reflect that fact. The Code entitles her
to damages caused by the company's breach of warranty, and nothing
more.
252
b. Code Policies in Non-Code Cases
i. The Warranty Sections
The comments to section 2-3 13 reflect the Code's stance in favor of
extra-textual application of the warranty sections on the basis of policy.
Comment 2 provides:
Although this section is limited in its scope and
direct purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer
as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of
[Article 2] are not designed in any way to disturb those
lines of case law growth which have recognized that
warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or
to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in
other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of
bailments for hire, whether such bailment is itself the main
contract or is merely a supplying of containers under a
contract for the sale of their contents. The provisions of
Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries expressly
recognize this case law development within one particular
area. Beyond that, the matter is left to the case law with
the intention that the policies of [the Code] may offer
useful guidance in dealing with further cases as they
253
arise.
There is also support for that stance in case law254 and Code literature.
211
Indeed, one author has suggested that an earnings claim made in
252 4A ANDERSON, supra note 230, § 2:714:35 (1997 rev. of vol. 4) ("The fact that
there is a breach of warranty does not in itself entitle the buyer to recover damages;
the buyer must show what damages were proximately caused by the breach."
(footnote omitted)).
253 U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2 (2002).
254 See 1 HARRIS & SQUILLANTE, supra note 244, § 6.8 (1989) ("Application of the
Code's language of express warranty to transactions outside the sale of goods is
common in the case law. Although § 2-313 is phrased in Article 2 terminology, those
courts which are willing to apply Code warranty law do so by analogy in these
situations."); Johnson v. Healy, 405 A.2d 54 (Conn. 1978) (discussed infra notes
270-82 and accompanying text).
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negotiations for the sale of a franchise could constitute an express warranty
by description under section 2-313(1)(b).256
ii. The Code Generally
Article 1 consists of sections that apply throughout the remainder of
the Code. Section 1-103 is entitled "Construction of [the Code] to Promote
its Purposes and Policies; Applicability of Supplemental Principles of
Law. 257 Subsection (a) calls on courts to engage in policy analysis: "[The
Code] must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies., 258 Brown will argue that the notion of liberal
application includes application to cases that arise outside the text of the
Code. She will also cite subsection (b), which prescribes the relationship
between the Code and the common law-a relationship in which common
law rules supplement the Code except where its provisions displace them.
259
A comment to the section explains that displacement extends not only to
those common law rules that are inconsistent with the Code's text but also
to those that are inconsistent with its "purposes and policies., 260 Another
comment emphasizes that courts can appropriately apply statutory policies
even in cases that statutory text does not reach.26'
255 See James O'Reilly, An Eyefor An Eye: Foresight on Remedies for LASIK
Surgery's Problems, 71 U. CrN. L. REv. 541, 551, 551 n.52 (2002) (Harm resulting
from LASIK surgery may give rise to cause of action for breach of express warranty
based on advertisements for the surgery; "[c]onceptually, eye surgery is a service
rather than 'goods,' so the conventional treatment of express warranties under
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-313 is available only by analogy."); A. Darby
Dickerson, Note, Bailor Beware: Limitations and Exclusions ofLiability in
Commercial Bailments, 41 VAND. L. REv. 129, 165-66 (1988); Goetz et al., supra
note 230, at 1168-70.
256 Comment, supra note 9, at 1006-07.
257 U.C.C. § 1-103 (2001).
258 Id. § 1-103(a).
259 Id. § 1-103(b). In general, Code sections displace otherwise applicable common
law rules. See William D. Hawkland & Frederick H. Miller, Revised Article 1:
General Provisions § 1-103:2 in 1 HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES
(2002) ("[T]he paramount rule of construction now is preemption."). For an example
of a Code section that does not displace the common law rule on the same subject,
see U.C.C. § 3-117 (2002).
260 U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (2001). See also Hawkland & Miller, supra note 259, § 1-
103:2 ("[P]reemption extends to the displacement of any law that is inconsistent with
the Code's express terms or its purposes and policies .....
261 The comment provides in part:
Even prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, courts were careful to keep broad acts from being hampered in
their effects by later acts of limited scope. The courts have often
recognized that the policies embodied in an act are applicable in
reason to subject-matter that was not expressly included in the
language of the act, and did the same where reason and policy so
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With or without citation to these comments, courts have applied
Code sections to non-Code transactions in many cases.262 Consider the
methodology of the Idaho Supreme Court:
In order to determine which provisions are applicable, we
will look to the commercial setting in which the problem
arises and contrast the relevant common law with Article
2-we will use Article 2 as "a premise for reasoning only
when the case involves the same considerations that gave
rise to the Code provisions and an analogy is not rebutted
by additional antithetical circumstances.
263
Commentators on the Code have also argued that courts should base their
decisions about whether to apply Code principles in common law cases on
policy considerations. 26 James White and Robert Summers explain:
required, even where the subject-matter had been intentionally
excluded from the act in general. They implemented a statutory
policy with liberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory
text. They disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy where the
reason of the limitation did not apply. Nothing in the Uniform
Commercial Code stands in the way of the continuance of such
action by the courts.
The Uniform Commercial Code should be construed in
accordance with its underlying purposes and policies. The text of
each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of
the rule or principle in question, as also of the Uniform Commercial
Code as a whole, and the application of the language should be
construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity
with the purposes and policies involved.
U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (2001) (citations omitted).
262 See, e.g., 1A ANDERSON, supra note 230, § 2-102:24 (1996 rev. of vol. 1) ("There
is a judicial tendency to apply Article 2 to transactions that are not only not sales of
goods but that are not transactions within the scope of the Code." (footnote omitted)).263 Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 541 P.2d 1184, 1190 (Idaho 1975)
(quoting Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning,
65 COLUM. L. REv. 880, 888 (1965)). See also, e.g., J.L. Teel Co. v. Houston United
Sales, Inc., 491 So.2d 851, 857 (Miss. 1986) (adopting the methodology of Glenn
Dick); William D. Hawkland, Article 1: General Provisions § 1-102:11 in
HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES (1998) (citing numerous cases in
which courts have used analogies to "fill gaps and even, when reason and policy
require, to extend a rule to subject matter which has been intentionally excluded from
the [Code].").
264 See, e.g., Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2201, 2210
(1991). Frier observes that readers of a systematically codified body of law can use
inductive reasoning to identify principles that find expression in more than one
section. Those principles can then be applied not only to interpretive problems that
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We believe that the best general approach for courts to take
is to determine what policy objectives the particular Code
section in question implicates, and then, in light of those
policies, determine whether the particular facts of the
transaction invite the application of the section by analogy.
... Of course, there may be a competing body of law, too,
the policies of which must also be considered. And in a
proper case, that body of law should control, not Article
2.265
The author of a student comment published nearly forty years ago
advocated application of selected Code sections to franchise contracts on
the basis of policy:
The fact that franchise rights may be an analogue of Code
goods should not be the primary focus of an analogical use.
Rather, the court should look to the reasons which brought
about the Code's statement of a particular rule to determine
if these reasons are equally valid in the context of the
franchise agreement.266
arise within the Code but also, by analogy, to problems that arise outside the Code.
Id.
265 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 1-1.
266 Comment, supra note 9, at 984 (footnote omitted). The author continued:
A corollary ... is ... that courts looking at a franchise agreement
should be attuned to the same basic policies as those enunciated by
the Code: (1) "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;" (2) "to permit the continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties;" (3) "to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions." While the analogical use of the Code may benefit
only one of the parties to a distribution agreement during litigation, it
is reasonable to assume that the application of a uniform act would
ultimately benefit the entire industry by correcting some of the legal
uncertainty that surrounds franchising.
Id. at 984-85 (footnotes omitted) (quoting U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1962)). The author
also suggested that in time a specialized body of law might govern franchising,
lessening the need for application of general rules of contract law such as the Article
2 rules. Id. at 1009. With respect to express warranties in franchise sales, however,
those specialized rules have yet to develop.
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In short, there is strong support in case law, in the comments to the Code,
and in academic commentary for extra-textual application of Code sections
where the policies underlying those sections are apposite.267
B. Express Warranties in the Common Law
Brown may be able to find useful precedents in the law of real
estate transactions, the law of service contracts, or the law governing sales
of businesses. 2 68 In the real estate field, she will also find statutes and
regulations that require warranties or disclosures by sellers in certain kinds
of sales. The statutes may or may not be helpful, but in general the cases
will offer Brown two kinds of support. First, of course, they will provide at
least arguable analogies. And second, to the extent that they reflect the
influence of sale-of-goods law on the common law, they are
methodological precedents-examples of the kind of doctrinal development
she will commend to the court.
1. Real Estate
In some reported cases, courts have enforced express warranties in
real estate sales.269 In Johnson v. Healy,270 for example, the Connecticut
Supreme Court considered claims made by the disappointed buyer of a new
267 Michael Garner sounds a cautionary note with respect to business format
franchises, however:
Some decisions have expressed the view that the Code's provisions
are too rigid to accommodate a true franchise relationship,
particularly a business format franchise, because, among other
things, the interests of the parties are much broader than the interests
of parties to a sale of goods. Moreover, in a franchise relationship,
there are trademark and business format issues that the [Code] does
not address; some would argue that a franchise involves a much
more personalized relationship than a sale of goods. Thus, while
some cases seem to have been quick to embrace the [Code], the
courts should proceed with caution, particularly with respect to
business format franchises.
2 GARNER, supra note 6, § 8:3 (footnote omitted).
268 Brown will not be able to consult the law of warranties generally, according to
two leading commentators, because there is no such law: "For the lawyer whose
client has a warranty problem, there is no single source of warranty law. Instead,
there are many interwoven strands, some statutory, some regulatory, and some
judicial." 1 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 228, § 1:3.
69 See generally 1 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, FRIEDMAN ON
CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 2:1.3 (7"h ed. 2008);
Annotation, Liability of Builder- Vendor or Other Vendor of New Dwelling for Loss,
Injury, or Damage Occasioned by Defective Condition Thereof 25 A.L.R.3d 383 § 5
(1969 & Supp. 2008).
"0 405 A.2d 54 (Conn. 1978).
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home built by the seller. The seller, though experienced in the real estate
business, had never built a home before, but the buyer learned of his
inexperience only after the closing. Writing for the court, Justice Peters
summarized the basis of the plaintiff buyer's claim:
As part of the negotiations leading to the contract of sale of
the house, the plaintiff inquired about the quality of its
construction. The defendant replied that the house was
made of the best material, that he had built it, and that there
was nothing wrong with it. These representations were
relied upon by the plaintiff and induced him to purchase the
house. The damage which the house sustained because of
its uneven settlement was due to improper fill which had
been placed on the lot beneath the building at some time
before the defendant bought the lot, as a building lot, in
1963.271
Neither the written sales agreement nor the deed contained any express
warranties concerning the construction of the house. Yet the supreme court
upheld the lower court's decision finding the seller liable.
At least three aspects of Johnson are helpful to Brown. First, like
her case, it involved a buyer who relied upon but did not receive a
competent performance by the seller. Just as Brown learned of Swift's lack
of expertise only after buying her franchise, the buyer in Johnson learned of
the seller's inexperience in construction only after buying the house.
Second, just as Brown's Franchise Agreement did not incorporate Paula's
affirmation and promise, the real estate contract did not include the seller's
assurances of quality. Third, the real estate seller's statement was much
less formal than the disclosure document Brown received. Justice Peters
explained why such an informal assurance was enforceable:
Although indefinite, the [seller's] statement that there was
"nothing wrong" with the house could reasonably have
been heard by the [buyer] as an assertion that the [seller]
had sufficient factual information to justify his general
opinion about the quality of the house. In context, this
statement of opinion could reasonably have induced
reliance.27 2
If an assurance as vague as the seller's can be a basis for warranty liability,
Paula's formal affirmation and promise should surely be enforceable as
warranties.
271 Id. at 55-56.
272 Id. at 57.
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Johnson also illustrates the judicial methodology that Brown
advocates. The plaintiff had pled misrepresentation, and the trial court had
found the seller liable on that theory but had also "concluded that the
[seller] had made an express warranty coextensive with the doctrine of
implied warranty of workmanship and habitability in cases involving the
sale of new homes by a builder., 273 Justice Peters, a former professor of
commercial law, wrote that in the United States express warranty law had
become "firmly established, no later than the promulgation of the Uniform
Sales Act in 1906. "274 The Code had clarified "basic remedial principles"
of earlier warranty law, and those principles retained their strength in the
wake of its enactment. 27' Noting the convergence of warranty and strict
liability for innocent misrepresentation, Peters wrote that Connecticut
courts had applied the doctrine of innocent misrepresentation to the sale of
goods as early as 1850.276 In a case decided in 1932,277 the court had
applied that doctrine to a construction contract, reasoning that the
contractor's misrepresentation was actionable "in analogy to the right of a
vendee to elect to retain goods which are not as warranted, and to recover
damages for the breach of warranty. '278 The 1850 case and the 1932 case
made "clear that liability for innocent misrepresentation is not a novelty in
[Connecticut], that such liability is based on principles of warranty, and that
such warranty law is not confined to contracts for the sale of goods. 279
Policy considerations relating to real estate sales justified extending
"warranty liability for innocent misrepresentation to a builder-vendor who
sells a new home ....
Despite the emphasis on misrepresentation as well as warranty in
both the trial court and the Connecticut Supreme Court, the plaintiff was
entitled to an expectation remedy. The measure of damages was the
273 Id. at 56.
274 id.
275 405 A.2d at 56.
276 Id. (citing Bartholomew v. Bushnell, 20 Conn. 271 (1850)).
277 E. & F. Constr. Co. v. Stamford, 158 A. 551 (1932).
278 Johnson, 405 A.2d at 57 (quoting E. & F. Constr. Co. v. Stamford, 158 A. 551,
553 (1932)).
279 id.
280 Id. (footnote and citation omitted). See also Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608,
611 n.4 (Alaska 1980). In Cousineau, a buyer of real estate sued for rescission based
on innocent misrepresentations by the seller. The court wrote that, although the Code
did not apply directly, its warranty provisions were illuminating:
We do not contend that real property transactions are the
same as those involving sales of goods. Nevertheless, an analogy to
the applicability of the doctrine of caveat emptor under the Uniform
Commercial Code is helpful. Under the Code, factual statements
regarding the sale of goods constitute an express warranty.
Id. at 615 (footnote omitted).
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difference between the value of the property if it had been as warranted and
its value as delivered. 8 In a case that the Code did not govern, then, the
court applied an express warranty rule that was rooted in part in law
governing sales of goods.282
Other courts have upheld enforcement of express warranties in real
estate sales283 or held that express warranty claims stated causes of
action.284 Still others have stated in dicta that those claims can be viable.285
In Dittman v. Nagel,286 for example, the court concluded that a contract for
the sale of a used home included an express warranty. There was, the court
wrote, "very little case law which discusse[d] express warranties of quality
as they apply to realty. 28 7 Although the Code warranty provisions did not
apply to the sale of real estate, and although the court did not cite section 2-
313, it did suggest that the Code principles could help to fill the common
law vacuum: "the legal principles which have developed regarding express
warranties as they apply to the sale of goods certainly appear to be equally
applicable to an express warranty of quality involved in a sale of realty."
288
211 Id. at 58-59. See DOBBS, supra note 24, § 483 (expectation relief is appropriate if
"the innocent misrepresentation is a true contractual warranty, that is, an implicit or
explicit understanding of the parties.").
282 For criticism, see DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, WARRANTIES AND THE PRACTITIONER 234
(1981) (By adopting a tort theory, the court "neatly side-stepped" the statute of frauds
and the parol evidence rule.).
283 See, e.g., Krupp v. Fed. Hous. Admin., 285 F.2d 833, 834-35 (1st Cir. 1961)
(statement by Federal Housing Administration in prospectus describing real estate to
be sold constituted warranty); Meyers v. Antone, 227 A.2d 56 (D.C. 1967) (enforcing
warranty of functioning heating system given by seller who built home); A.W. Easter
Const. Co. v. White, 224 S.E.2d 112 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (express warranties of
quality in sale of new home built by the seller); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698,
704 (Idaho 1966) (enforcing oral warranty given by seller who built home that home
was "built of the finest materials and by the finest workmen available and that it
would be a fine home"); Flom v. Stahly, 569 N.W.2d 135, 139-42 (Iowa 1997)
(enforcing express warranties in writings which, the court concluded, the parties had
expressly incorporated in their sales agreement); Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc.,
190 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1963) (enforcing oral warranty of habitable basement in new
home against seller who built home).
284 See, e.g., Winstead Land Dev. Co. v. Design Collaborative Architects, No. CV
960071571, 1997 Conn. Super. Lexis 1501, *3-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 1997)
(following Johnson v. Healy, 405 A.2d 54 (Conn. 1978)); Neppl v. Murphy, 736
N.E.2d 1174, 1178-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Edwards v. Schuh, 5 S.W.3d 829, 832-33
(Tex. App. 1999).
285 See, e.g., Dittman v. Nagel, 168 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. 1969) (sellers gave express
warranty of quality of well water but buyers failed to show breach of warranty);
Garriffa v. Taylor, 675 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1984) (real estate sellers can give express
warranties, but evidence in case did not support finding of express warranty
regarding septic system).
286 168 N.W.2d 190 (Wis. 1969).287 Id. at 193.
288 id.
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Some courts, moreover, have applied other Code warranty policies to real
estate sales.289
At least four factors, however, may tend to limit the number of real
estate cases that can provide analogies for Brown. First, in some cases in
which the courts have found express warranties in real estate sales, the
warranties were included or incorporated by reference in the written
contract for sale. 290 Those cases do not stand for the proposition that, in the
absence of helpful language in the contract of sale, warranty law draws into
that contract affirmations or promises made during the negotiation phase.
Second, there are some potential doctrinal obstacles to claims like
those of the plaintiff in Johnson. Contracts for the sale of real estate are
subject to the statute of frauds, and there is some authority for the
proposition that an oral express warranty is unenforceable under the
statute.291 If a written sales agreement does not include a warranty,
evidence of the warranty may be inadmissible under the parol evidence
rule.292 And even if the warranty is included in the written sales agreement,
it may fall victim to the merger doctrine 293 if it is not included in the
deed.294 Although some buyers have succeeded in overcoming one or more
of those obstacles,295 others may have either decided not to litigate or
litigated without establishing precedents that Brown can use.
2 96
289 See, e.g., Lake Bluff Heating & A.C. v. Harris Trust, 452 N.E.2d 1361, 1367 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) (applying policy of Code § 2-316(1) on disclaimers of express
warranties).
290 See, e.g., Neppl v. Murphy, 736 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (111. App. Ct. 2000); Flom v.
Stahly, 569 N.W.2d 135, 138, 140 (Iowa 1997).
291 See 1 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 228, § 2:31. As Clark and Smith acknowledge,
however, the buyer may argue successfully that the warranty is collateral to the sale
and that it is not an essential term of the sales agreement for purposes of the statute.
Id. See also RICHARD A. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 14:81.02 [ I ] [d] [i]
(Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2000).
292 See 1 CLARK& SMITH, supra note 228, § 2:3 1.
293 See 2 FRIEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 269, § 8:16 ("Upon the buyer's acceptance
of the deed, merger takes place. The seller's obligations under the contract of sale
with respect to the conveyance are discharged, and thereafter the buyer's rights are
based solely on the warranties, if any, in the deed.").
294 1 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 228, § 2:31. But see 2 FRIEDMAN & SMITH, supra
note 269, § 8:16 ("[W]here the contract of sale creates rights collateral to or
independent of the conveyance, those rights survive delivery of the deed." (footnote
omitted)); Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 190 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1963) (seller's
oral warranty in sale of new home collateral to transfer of title and therefore not
merged in deed).295 See I CLARK& SMITH, supra note 228, § 2:31. See also, e.g., Meyers v. Antone,
227 A.2d 56, 57 (D.C. 1967) (warranty included in written sales agreement collateral
to transfer of title and therefore not merged in deed); Caparrelli, 190 A.2d at 372
(seller's oral warranty in sale of new home collateral to transfer of title and therefore
not merged in deed).
296 See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle ": Judicial Promotion
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1340 (1994). Galanter and
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The third factor is the body of statutory law that governs many
modem real estate transactions.297 In some states, for example, sales of
condominiums, coops, and planned communities are governed by the
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.298 That act contains a section
providing for the creation of express warranties which closely resembles
U.C.C. section 2-313.299 In some other states, condominium sales are
governed by the Uniform Condominium Act,300 which includes an identical
301provision.
Some states have adopted laws that govern express warranties in
the sale of new homes, 302 and many have adopted statutes that require
sellers of used homes to fill out and provide to buyers disclosure forms
concerning the condition of the property to be sold.30 3 Although the
disclosures do not constitute warranties, 304 failure to provide the required
information can subject sellers to liability to their buyers.305 Some real
estate sales are subject to the disclosure requirements of the Federal
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.30 6 That Act provides purchasers
of property with a right of action against developers who fail to provide the
requisite disclosure.30 7 Moreover, several states have adopted the Uniform
Cahill note that "two-thirds of cases. .. settle without a definitive judicial ruling."
Id. Of the other third, moreover, by no means all culminate in reported opinions.
See, e.g., Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of
Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 107, 149 (2007)
(concluding that "[p]ublished summary-judgment grants are only a small subset of all
such grants in the federal courts.").
297 Any such statutes in Brown's jurisdiction may or may not help her persuade the
court to find common law express warranties in her case. See infra text at note 315.
298 There are two versions of the Act. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP
ACT §§ 1-101 to 5-110,7 U.L.A. PART 1840-1009 (2005); UNIF. COMMON INTEREST
OWNERSHIP ACT §§ 1-101 to 5-110,7 U.L.A. PART II 1-174 (2002).
299 See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 4-113, 7 U.L.A. PART 1, at 990-
91 (2005); UNF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 4-113, 7 U.L.A. PART II, at
149-50 (2002).
300 See UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT §§ 1-101 to 5-110, 7 U.L.A. PART II 457-637
(2002).301 See id. § 4-113, at 611-12.
302 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-117 (2007).
303 See generally George Lefcoe, Property Condition Disclosure Forms: How the
Real Estate Industry Eased the Transition from Caveat Emptor to "Seller Tell All,"
39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 193 (2004).
304 Id. at 212 ("Disclosure statutes uniformly caution that a seller's truthful
disclosure is not to be taken as a warranty of the condition of the property being
sold. Similarly, disclosure forms typically proclaim, sometimes in a big, bold font:
'This is not a warranty.').
305 Id. at 230-31.
'06 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (2006).
307 Id. § 1709(a).
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Land Sales Practices Act,30 8 which provides for registration 30 9 and
disclosure310 and gives buyers a private action for violations".31 These
statutes and, in some cases, their accompanying regulations, may have
reduced the incentives for disappointed buyers to sue for breach of common
law express warranties in real estate sales.312
The fourth factor is the increasing frequency with which builders,
their buyers, and sometimes third parties, are employing written warranty
contracts designed to be delivered to the buyer at the closing. 313 Although
this trend might seem likely to lead to more litigation and thus more
reported cases, the use of what amounts to warranty insurance 314 may in
fact prevent many disputes from reaching the litigation stage. A related
practice which may have the same effect is disclosure pursuant to a term in
308 UNIF. LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL LAND SALES PRACTICES ACT §§ 1-24, 7A
U.L.A. PART 11 210-43 (2006).319 Id. § 5, at 217-19.
3 10 Id. § 6, at 220-21.
31 1Id. § 16, at 236-37.
312 The statutes may have limited the development of the common law of express
warranties in real estate sales even though, "[f]or the most part, [those that require
the completion of seller disclosure forms] have been drafted to complement, but not
to modify or otherwise interfere with, the evolving common law of seller
disclosure." Lefcoe, supra note 303, at 199. Lefcoe adds that "[s]ellers remain
obligated to disclose known material latent defects (as defined by courts over time)
not readily observable to buyers." Id. Moreover, to the extent that the statutes
effectively provide for private enforcement, they are not likely to generate
precedents that will be useful to Brown, who must contend with the lack of a private
action under the FTC Rule.
313 Friedman and Smith describe this trend:
Many larger builders offer their own express warranties in a
standardized form, but more significant are warranties given or
guaranteed by third parties. For example, the Residential Warranty
Corporation.. . is presently the largest national issuer of third-party
warranties for new housing. It offers warranties on new homes,
including manufactured homes, as well as remodeling projects.
Builders who wish to provide [the corporation's] policies to their
buyers must apply for membership in the [corporation's] program
and meet specified standards. A buyer who purchases from a
participating builder receives a written.., policy, which insures
against a range of defects for certain time periods that vary
according to the type of defect. The builder pays a small premium to
the [corporation] for the policy.
1 FRIEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 269, § 2:1.3 at 2-23 (footnotes omitted).
314 See supra note 313.
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either the listing agreement or the contract for sale,315 even in the absence of
a statutory or administrative requirement.
Brown can argue, of course, that even as statutes and regulations
tend to inhibit the development of the common law of express warranties in
real estate, they also represent legislative and administrative endorsements
of the principal policy of Code section 2-313: that the seller should have to
stand behind what he or she said to procure the sale. The court may agree.
On the other hand, it may reason that the legislature or agency deliberately
chose to regulate real estate sales but not franchise sales. If so, the court is
unlikely to regard the statute or regulation as helpful to Brown.
2. Services
Brown may find some helpful precedents in the law governing
contracts for the sale of services. Perhaps the most famous case involving
an express warranty in a service contract is the venerable Hawkins v.
McGee,316 in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court enforced a doctor's
warranty that surgery would give his patient "a hundred percent good
hand. 3 17 A more modem example in the medical context is Sullivan v.
O'Connor, 318 in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld
an award of reliance damages to a patient whose cosmetic surgery failed to
produce the result her doctor had promised. Other warranties of specific
319medical results have led to liability in some cases.
Many construction contracts contain express warranties, 320 and
some construction cases may furnish helpful analogies.32' In Anthony's
315 Either the listing agreement or the purchase and sale agreement, or both, may
require the seller to provide disclosure to the buyer. See Lefcoe, supra note 303, at
229.
316 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
317 Id. at 643.
318 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).
319 See Mills v. Pate, 225 S.W.3d 277, 289-91 (Tex. App. 2006) (reversing grant of
summary judgment for doctor on patient's claim of breach of express warranty).
See generally Jack W. Shaw, Jr., Recovery Against Physician on Basis of Breach of
Contract to Achieve Particular Result or Cure, 43 A.L.R.3d 1221 (1972 & Supp.
2008).320 See, e.g., IRV RICHTER & Roy S. MITCHELL, HANDBOOK OF CONSTRUCTION LAW
AND CLAIMS 238-40 (1982); id. at 238 ("Construction contracts commonly include a
guaranty or warranty clause."); AIA Document A 107-1997, Abbreviated Standard
Form ofAgreement Between Owner and Contractor for Construction Projects of
Limited Scope where the basis ofpayment is a STIPULA TED SUM Article 8.4,
reprinted in E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, SELECTIONS FOR
CONTRACTS 355, 361 (2003).
321 See William K. Jones, Economic Losses Caused by Construction Deficiencies:
The Competing Regimes of Contract and Tort, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1051, 1066 (1991)
("If a seller has made representations, an action may lie for breach of express
warranty or for misrepresentation." (footnote omitted)). For an argument in favor
of application of Code rules in construction cases, see Emmie West, Note,
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Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Engineers, Inc. ,322 for example, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts treated statements that were not
incorporated in a formal contract of sale as express warranties. The case
involved a company that had designed a foundation and mooring system for
a ship so that the ship could serve as a cocktail lounge for an onshore
restaurant in Boston. The ship broke loose during a storm and capsized,
and the owner of the restaurant sued the company for breach of an express
warranty.
The company moved for summary judgment with respect to the
owner's claim that he had suggested a specific design modification to
strengthen the system and better protect the ship-a modification that the
company had rejected on the basis that its design was sufficient.323 The
trial court granted the motion, but the supreme judicial court reversed:
In rejecting the suggestion, [the company] assured the
[owner] that its work would be fit for the intended purpose
of permanently mooring the ship. Such an assurance would
impose a higher standard of performance on [the company]
than its implied warranty of reasonable care. Therefore,
there is evidence from which a fact finder could conclude
that [the company] made assurances amounting to an
express warranty.
324
Although statements lacking that degree of specificity would not constitute
express warranties, 325 the owner was entitled to a trial on the issue of the
design modification.
In 2005, a Texas appellate court decided a case that more closely
resembles Brown's. 326 Jacqueline Head contracted with a company called
U.S. Inspect DFW for an inspection of a house in Fort Worth which she had
agreed to buy. Under the inspection contract, a "licensed real estate
inspector" was to perform the inspection.327 The contract "specified that
Construction Contracting: Building Better Law With the Uniform Commercial
Code, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1067, 1084 (2002). West advocates application of
the Code to all hybrid construction contracts.
322 489 N.E.2d 172 (Mass. 1986).
323 Id. at 173, 178 (citations omitted).
324Id. at 178.
321 Summary judgment for the company was proper, the supreme judicial court
wrote, with respect to other claims of breach of warranty. The owner claimed, for
example, that the company had assured him that the design would be "adequate and
sufficient for the purposes for which it was intended." Without "any more specific
language, or indication of the circumstances in which [the owner] was so
'informed,"' the court wrote, "[the company's] statements appear to be no more
than opinions that lack a promissory nature." Id.
326 Head v. U.S. Inspect DFW, 159 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App. 2005).
121 Id. at 735.
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neither the inspection nor the report would include any warranties, express
or implied, unless specifically stated., 328 An "apprentice inspector," who
was neither licensed nor supervised by a licensed inspector, inspected the
attic and roof of the house and failed to discover serious defects that had
resulted in substantial water damage. 329 After discovering the defects, Head
sued U.S. Inspect for violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA").
Head needed to establish that the provision entitling her to an
inspection by licensed inspector was a breach of an express warranty that
violated the DTPA. The statute prohibits "[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" 330 and includes a
laundry list of prohibited practices.33' Unfortunately for Head, that list does
not include breach of an express warranty. The court concluded, however,
that an exception within an exemption indicates that a breach of warranty
can constitute a violation. The DTPA exempts "the rendering of a
professional service, the essence of which is the providing of advice,
judgment, opinion or similar professional skill. 332 And that "exemption
does not apply to... breach of an express warranty that cannot be
characterized as advice, judgment, or opinion ... The exception for
express warranties that "cannot be characterized as advice, judgment, or
opinion" implies that breaches of express warranties that cannot be so
characterized can violate the DTPA.
The court observed that the DTPA neither defines nor creates any
warranties. To prove an actionable breach of warranty, therefore, a plaintiff
must demonstrate the existence of a warranty under a statute or the common
law. Head alleged breaches of express warranties "set forth in the
inspection [contract (1)] that . . . 'a licensed professional real estate
inspector would perform the inspection"' and (2) "that the inspection would
be conducted in accordance with the standards of the Texas Real Estate
Commission. 33 4 In the absence of an applicable statute concerning
warranties, the question was whether the common law recognized those
warranties.
The court gave an affirmative answer. "Because warranty law has
developed mainly in transactions involving goods," the court wrote, "we
may look to the [U.C.C.], which concerns express warranties and the sale of
goods, for guidance. 33 5 Following an earlier case in which the Supreme
Court of Texas had applied Code express warranty concepts in the context
328 Id. at 735.
329 id.
330 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon 2002).
331 Id. § 17.46(b).
332 Id. § 17.49(c).
13 Id. § 17.49(c)(4).
314 Head, 159 S.W.3d at 746.
335 id.
2009]
508 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA W [Vol. 3:2
JOURNAL
of a service contract, 336 the Head court denied summary judgment to U.S.
Inspect. The contract provision requiring inspection by a "licensed
inspector" was a promise "as to the quality of future services to be
provided," '337 and promises with respect to quality can create express
warranties under section 2-313. Head's evidence that U.S. Inspect had
breached its promise was evidence of a breach of warranty and thus of a
violation of the DTPA.
Although there are some differences,33 8 the parallel between Head's
case and Brown's is striking. Like U.S. Inspect, Paula's made and failed to
perform a promise to provide expert assistance. Like the Texas court, the
court in Brown's case should be guided by the Code to a finding that Brown
has a claim for breach of an express warranty.
339
Brown may be able to find other helpful precedents involving
service contracts, but she is by no means assured of doing so in her
jurisdiction. Courts have generally judged the performance of service
contracts by reference to concepts such as material breach 340 and
negligence. 34 1 The negligence approach, which focuses on the skill with
which the service provider performed, may be conducive to skepticism
336 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991).
131 Head, 159 S.W.3d at 747.
338 The promise the court enforced in Head was in the inspection contract, 159
S.W.3d at 742, so Head did not need to cite comment 3 to § 2-313, which makes
clear that affirmations and promises made during the negotiation process can create
warranties that are part of the contract for sale. See UCC § 2-313 cmt. 3 (2002).
Moreover, Head was a consumer and thus able to sue under the DTPA. See TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 2002).
339 For an additional Texas case recognizing a breach of express warranty claim in a
service transaction, see Blackwood v. Tom Benson Chevrolet Co., 702 S.W.2d 732
(Tex. App. 1985) (express warranty of quality of vehicle repair services).
340 Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial
Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 725, at 740 (1993) ("The cases emphasize a concept of
substantial performance and permit complete nonpayment only in the face of a
material breach.").
341 William Jones describes the prevailing approach:
The "proper efforts" standard is common in service contracts,
particularly in the case of professionals such as doctors, lawyers,
architects and engineers. In general, courts construe these contracts
as imposing no more than an obligation to employ proper efforts, in
conformity with standards of the profession, and there is no breach
even if the objective of the contract is not achieved-the patient dies,
the lawsuit is lost, the building collapses-as long as the contracting
party has made the proper effort.
Jones, supra note 321, at 1059 (footnotes omitted). See also Nimmer, supra note
340, at 740 ("The circumstances [of a service contract] lend themselves to a
reasonable person approach that closely resembles negligence law standards.").
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342about express warranties in service contracts. That skepticism may
inhibit buyers of services from asserting express warranty claims, thus
limiting the number of reported cases. In the view of at least one
commentator, moreover, the law of service contracts generally is not well
developed:
The law on services contracts comes from both common
law and scattered statutes. It contains an array of uncertain
legal doctrines. In contrast, commercial sales of goods are
governed by articulate, codified rules, which receive
extensive attention in legal literature and are being
rewritten for a second time in forty years to reflect modem
developments. The imbalance could not be more blatant,
nor could it be more unfortunate. It is time, actually long
past time, to include services contracts in the U.C.C.
343
The service warranty cases that Brown is able to locate, then, may not
constitute a coherent body of case law, much less a solid foundation for her
express warranty claim.
3. Businesses
A third possible source of analogies for Brown is the law regarding
express warranties in contracts for the sale of businesses. Given the fact
that she bought the right to operate a business using Paula's name and
system, that law might seem to be a rich lode of cases that would either
support or undercut her arguments. In practice, however, express
warranties in corporate acquisitions and mergers are often included in the
written contract of sale, and sometimes explicitly survive the closing.3 "
341 See, e.g., Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185 (1973) (causes of action for
breach of contract in doctor-patient setting "considered a little suspect .... ").
343 Nimmer, supra note 340, at 728-29. West highlights the Code's accessibility:
[M]any [Code] provisions are codifications of existing common law
principles. Part of the advantage in applying the [Code] to hybrid
construction contracts is not related to differences between [the
Code] and common law, but to the fact that the [Code] sets forth
general contracting principles in a clear, organized way with a body
of law that is recognized across jurisdictions. It makes no difference
that some of these principles are identical to common law;
construction industry professionals, their lawyers, and judges all can
refer to the [Code] with greater ease than to the current
amalgamation of common law principles.
West, supra note 321, at 1084 (footnotes omitted).
344 See generally WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQuISITIONS 162 (2d ed.
2007) ("The center of the acquisition agreement becomes the representations and
warranties given by the seller."); TItERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND
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Paula's affirmation and promise, of course, were neither explicitly stated as
warranties nor included in the Franchise Agreement. As a result, much of
the case law concerning express warranties in sales of businesses is not
relevant to the issue of whether the affirmation and promise were part of the
Franchise Contract.
345
The business cases may shed some light on the nature of any
reliance requirement that the court may impose on Brown. The law on that
point, however, will depend on her jurisdiction. Some courts hold that the
seller of a business can defeat the express warranty claim of his or her
buyer if the buyer did not rely on the truth of the seller's warranty. If, for
example, the buyer had reason to believe that the seller's statement was
false, some courts will deny recovery. Other courts hold, however, that the
only showing the buyer need make is that he or she relied on the existence
of the warranty, as opposed to its truth.34 6 Commentators who regard
ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 309-11 (2005); JERE D.
MCGAFFEY, BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES § 1.04(b) (2d ed. 1989)
("The most lengthy part of the acquisition agreement is normally the representation
and warranty section.").
345 An exception may be Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445 (10"' Cir. 1976).
During the negotiations for the sale of a company, the seller, Land, gave the buyer,
Roper, an unaudited interim financial statement for a period that ended several
weeks before the closing of the transaction. After the closing, Roper sued, claiming
breaches of two express warranties:
First, the representation by Land that the financial
statement.., had been prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis
throughout the period involved and presented fairly the financial
position of the Land company as of the dates thereof and the results
of operations and changes in the financial positions for the period
indicated.
Secondly, it was represented that there had been no adverse
changes in the business, property or general financial condition of
the Land Company as reflected by said financial statements ....
Id. at 447. The opinion does not make clear in what form Land made those
representations, although they may have been oral or otherwise outside the contract
of sale. If they were outside the contract, the case is consistent with White's view
that reliance should be necessary in cases in which alleged warranties are not part of
the contract "under conventional definitions of contract." White, supra note 242, at
2109-10. See supra text at notes 242-46. The Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court's judgment in favor of Land in part because there was substantial evidence to
support the district court's finding that Roper had made an independent
investigation of the financial condition of the business and had not relied on the
representations. Land, 531 F.2d at 449. Both courts applied Kansas law.
See Frank J. Wozniak, Purchaser 's Disbelief in, or Nonreliance Upon, Express
Warranties Made By Seller in Contract for Sale of Business as Precluding Action
for Breach of Express Warranties, 7 A.L.R. 5 h 841 (1992 & Supp. 2007).
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express warranty claims as purely contractual tend to favor the latter
view.
347
C. The FTC Rule
Brown may persuade the court that Code warranty policies support
extension of the common law of express warranties into the arena of
franchise sales, but she will recover only if the court admits her evidence of
express warranties. Because Paula's affirmation and promise concerning
site selection assistance are extrinsic to the Franchise Agreement, which
contains a merger clause, the company will argue that her evidence, in the
form of the disclosure document, is inadmissible.
348
Under the newly revised FTC Rule, however, it is illegal for a
franchisor to disclaim in a franchise agreement affirmations or promises
made in a disclosure document:
It is an unfair or deceptive act or practice in
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act for any franchise seller covered by [the Rule] to:
(a) Make any claim or representation, orally,
visually, or in writing, that contradicts the information
required to be disclosed by this part.
(g) Present for signing a franchise agreement in
which the terms and conditions differ materially from those
presented as an attachment to the disclosure document,
unless the franchise seller informed the prospective
franchisee of the differences at least seven days before
execution of the franchise agreement.
(h) Disclaim or require a prospective franchisee to
waive reliance on any representation made in the disclosure
document or in its exhibits or amendments. Provided,
however, that this provision is not intended to prevent a
prospective franchisee from voluntarily waiving specific
contract terms and conditions set forth in his or her
347 See Kwestel, supra note 240; Matthew J. Duchemin, Comment, Whether
Reliance on the Warranty is Required in a Common Law Action for Breach ofAn
Express Warranty?, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 689 (1999).
348 For discussion of the parol evidence rule as applied to the statements in the
disclosure document, see supra notes 205-24 and accompanying text.
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disclosure document during the course of franchise sale
negotiations.34 9
Subject to the proviso in subsection (h), then, any franchise agreement
provision designed to disclaim an affirmation or promise in the disclosure
document should be unenforceable. The FTC's Statement of Basis and
Purpose explains the Agency's reasoning: "The use of integration clauses or
waivers to disclaim statements in the disclosure document that the
franchisor authorizes would undermine the Rule's very purpose by
signaling to prospective franchisees that they cannot trust or rely upon the
disclosure document. ' ,350 Although the Agency has declined to prohibit the
use of merger, or integration, clauses in franchise agreements altogether, 35
it clearly believes that the clauses should not shield franchisors from the
consequences of improper disclosure.
Paula's will respond to Brown's illegality argument by citing the
proviso in (h), arguing that the integration clause in the Franchise
Agreement is not illegal because it represents her voluntary waiver of
"specific contract terms and conditions set forth in [the] disclosure
document during the course of franchise sale negotiations. 352 On the
distinction between a permissible waiver and an impermissible merger
clause or disclaimer, Brown will argue that a permissible waiver must refer
349 16 C.F.R. § 436.9 (2008).
350 2007 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 32, at 15,534 (footnotes
omitted).
351 See 16 C.F.R. § 436.9 (2008). For the Agency's reasoning, see 2007 Statement
of Basis and Purpose, supra note 32, at 15,533-34.
The FTC's Franchise Rule-2008 Compliance Guide includes a sample
merger and disclaimer provision that would comply with the Rule:
This Agreement and all exhibits to this Agreement
constitute the entire agreement between the parties and supersede
any and all prior negotiations, understandings, representations, and
agreements. Nothing in this or in any related agreement, however, is
intended to disclaim the representations we made in the franchise
disclosure document that we furnished to you.
You acknowledge that you are entering into this Agreement
as a result of your own independent investigation of our franchised
business and not as a result of any representations about us made by
our shareholders, officers, directors, employees, agents,
representatives, independent contractors, or franchisees that are
contrary to the terms set forth in this Agreement, or in any disclosure
document, prospectus, or other similar document required or
permitted to be given to you pursuant to applicable law.
Compliance Guide, supra note 351, Sample Integration Provision, at 143.
352 16 C.F.R. § 436.9(h) (2008).
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explicitly to specific terms set forth in the disclosure document.353 The
FTC agrees; the Statement of Basis and Purpose explains the need for
waivers in a limited class of cases:
[The waiver] proviso is necessary because, in its absence, a
franchisor might conclude that it is prohibited from
agreeing to any terms or conditions not spelled out in the
standard agreement attached as an exhibit to its disclosure
document. Clearly, franchise sellers and prospective
franchisees should be free to negotiate the terms of the
franchise agreement, as in all other commercial
transactions. The [FTC] has no interest in preventing the
parties from seeking the best deal possible, as long as the
prospective franchisee understands in advance of the sale
how the terms and conditions differ from the standard ones
set forth in the disclosure document and has the
opportunity to review the actual franchise agreement prior
to the sale.354
The proviso in subsection (h), then, is designed to apply only to differences
between the terms of the standard agreement and the agreement the
prospective franchisee signs. A waiver could relieve the franchisor of
liability for failure to perform a promise made in the standard agreement
but, as a result of a choice by the franchisor and the franchisee, not included
in the franchisee's agreement. The waiver could not, however, affect
liability based on a either a false or deceptive affirmation of fact in the
disclosure document 355 or a promise made in the disclosure document but
not repeated in the standard agreement.
To ensure the admission of her evidence of express warranties,
Brown must do more than establish the illegality of Paula's merger clause
to the extent that it effectively negates affirmations or promises in the
353 Brown's argument is consistent with the notion that underlies the Code's refusal
to give legal effect to disclaimers of express warranties in section 2-316. Buyers,
the Code drafters thought, needed protection against "unexpected and unbargained
language of disclaimer." See U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1 (2002).
354 2007 Statement of Basis and Purpose, supra note 32, at 15,535 (footnote
omitted).
355 The waiver would not, for example, affect the franchisor's liability for a false
affirmation of fact made under subsection 436.5(b) on business experience or (d)(1)
on bankruptcy. Subsection (b) requires disclosure of the identities of "individuals
who will have management responsibility relating to the sale or operation of
franchises," as well as the "principal positions and employers" of each of those
individuals. Subsection (d) requires disclosure of whether, during the 10-year
period ending on the date of the disclosure document, any of those individuals has,
among other things, "filed as debtor (or had filed against it) a petition under the
United States Bankruptcy Code .. " 16 C.F.R. § 436.5 (2008).
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disclosure document. She must also persuade the court that the clause
should be unenforceable to that extent. Although courts have frequently
refused to enforce contract provisions that violate statutes or administrative
regulations, they have not always done so. 356 With respect to provisions
that violate statutes, Allan Farnsworth explains that "[a] court may
conclude that the sanction explicitly provided by the legislature is adequate
to further the statute's underlying policy, without the additional sanction of
unenforceabi lity.
357
Brown will probably prevail, however. "As a general rule, an
illegal bargain is unenforceable and, often void. 3 58 Although the Franchise
Agreement as a whole does not necessarily offend public policy, the merger
clause does insofar as it applies to affirmations and promises in the
disclosure document, and courts have not hesitated to strike illegal clauses
from otherwise enforceable contracts.35 9 As the FTC observes, enforcement
of the merger clause to discharge those affirmations and promises would be
completely contrary to the purpose of the law that the clause violates.36 °
Even if the merger clause is unenforceable insofar as it relates to
promises and affirmations in the disclosure document, however, under
either Williston's or Corbin's approach to the parol evidence rule,36 1 the
court could in theory conclude that the Franchise Agreement was a
complete integration that made evidence of any site selection agreement
inadmissible. Under Williston's approach, the Franchise Agreement could
appear complete and the court could decide that a reasonable person in
Brown's position would not have signed it while believing that she was
contractually entitled to expert site selection assistance.3 62 Under Corbin's
approach, the court would be much less likely to find a complete
integration.3 63 Yet the court might decide that Brown's execution of the
Franchise Agreement manifested an intention to discharge any site selection
promise, perhaps in exchange for some other concession by the company.
364
On the whole, however, Brown is likely to prevail on the parol
evidence issue. Just as full enforcement of the merger clause despite its
partial illegality would be contrary to the purpose of the new FTC Rule
356 See PERILLO, supra note 170, § 22.2 (2003) ("Even if an agreement is illegal,
there are a number of situations in which a party may recover for breach of an
illegal executory bilateral contract.").
357 FARNSWORTH, supra note 201, § 5.5 (footnote omitted).
358 PERILLO, supra note 170, § 22.1 (footnotes omitted).
311 Id. § 22.2(d) ("An illegal provision does not necessarily render the entire contract
unenforceable. If the illegal provision is not central to the agreement and does not
involve serious moral turpitude, the illegal portion of the agreement is disregarded
and the balance of the agreement is enforceable." (footnote omitted)).
360 See supra text at note 350.
361 See supra notes 214-24 and accompanying text.
362 See supra text accompanying notes 219-20.363 See supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
364 id.
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provision, a finding that the Franchise Agreement was a complete
integration despite the absence of a fully enforceable merger clause would
be contrary to that purpose. Prospective franchisees are entitled to rely on
the contents of disclosure documents, and judges who understand that
entitlement are unlikely to let the parol evidence rule stand in the way.
IV. CONCLUSION
Freedman v. Meldy 'S36 5 and other cases in which courts have
refused to imply a private action under the FTC Rule may have the virtue of
judicial deference, but they can lead to injustice in cases like Brown's.
Courts should add a common law action for breach of express warranty to
the legal arsenal of a franchisee who suffers injury as a result of improper
disclosure. Together with the new Rule provision, that action will help
remedy injustice in some cases.
Section 2-313 can play an important role in persuading courts to
expand express warranty law to cover franchise sales. As Barkley Clark
and Christopher Smith observe, Article 2 is "by far the most important
source of warranty law today."366 Like the rest of the Article, the section is
in force in every state except Louisiana and has generated well-developed
bodies of interpretative case law and academic commentary. Particularly in
a jurisdiction with few helpful common law precedents, the section and its
case law offer a blueprint for the common law development.
Courts will probably continue to hold that sales of business format
franchises lie outside the boundaries of Article 2. As the ABA Forum on
Franchising panelists suggested,367 however, franchise lawyers and courts
should nevertheless consider the potential usefulness of Article 2 policies in
resolving business format franchise disputes.
365 587 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Pa. 1984). For discussion of the case, see supra text at
notes 74-82.
366 1 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 228, § 1:4, at 1-6.
367 See supra text at note 5.
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